Does democracy require value-neutral science? Analyzing the legitimacy of scientific information in the political sphere

Lusk, Greg

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.08.009

Cited by 19 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…I think it is important to begin with a discussion of actual legitimacy, for reasons similar to those I offer elsewhere for focusing on what makes science trustworthy, before focusing on what makes science trusted (Schroeder, 2021). be politically legitimate (Bäckstrand, 2003;Evans and Plows, 2007;Brown, 2009;Douglas, 2009;Kitcher, 2011;Eigi, 2017;Schroeder, 2021;Lusk, 2021). The basic idea is this.…”

Section: Political Improvementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversifying science: comparing the benefits of citizen science with the benefits of bringing more women into science

Schroeder

2022

Synthese

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I compare two different arguments for the importance of bringing new voices into science: arguments for increasing the representation of women, and arguments for the inclusion of the public, or for "citizen science". I suggest that in each case, diversifying science can improve the quality of scientific results in three distinct ways: epistemically, ethically, and politically. In the first two respects, the mechanisms are essentially the same. In the third respect, the mechanisms are importantly different. Though this might appear to suggest a broad similarity between the cases, I show that the analysis reveals an important respect in which efforts to include the public are more complex. With citizen science programs, unlike with efforts to bring more women into science, the three types of improvement are often in conflict with one another: improvements along one dimension may come at a cost on another dimension, suggesting difficult trade-offs may need to be made.

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Section: Political Improvementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversifying science: comparing the benefits of citizen science with the benefits of bringing more women into science

Schroeder

2022

Synthese

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“…In this article, I will take for granted the value of democratizing science in this way (for arguments, see Douglas [2005], Intemann [2015], Schroeder [2021], and Lusk [2021]). I will also sidestep the many empirical and normative questions that would need to be addressed before such an approach could be put into practice, and I will ignore concerns about feasibility.…”

Section: Democratizing Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…And second, it can clarify the consequences of ignoring the public. We have seen, for example, that scientists who set aside public values in these cases can still claim to be committed to democratized science, and thus can plausibly retain the benefits philosophers have argued accompany democratized science-for example, that the resulting research can claim a kind of political legitimacy (Lusk 2021;Schroeder 2021).…”

Section: Next Stepsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Democratizing Science: When Scientists Should Ignore the Public

Schroeder

2022

Philos. sci.

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Scientists are frequently called upon to “democratize” science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the non-epistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations, but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit the scientist to accepting the public’s objectionable values, or may she veto them? I argue that there are a limited set of cases where scientists can, consistently with a commitment to democratized science, set aside the public’s judgments.

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“…Recently, Schroeder (2021) suggested distinguishing between ethics-based approaches and political-philosophy-based approaches to the new demarcation problem. As Schroeder (2021, 248–50) observes, most previous work on science and values owes more to normative ethics, although some approaches adopt concepts, methods, and principles more at home in political philosophy, (e.g., Kitcher 2011; Intemann 2015; Lusk 2021). Because of the social and political significance of scientific activity, I agree with Lusk’s (2021, 109) proposal—following Schroeder (2021, 254)—for philosophers to embrace a specifically “political philosophy of science.” In this section, I aim to demonstrate how Rawls’s theory of justice, as laid out in his A Theory of Justice (1971) and in subsequent work, can help to determine which nonepistemic values may legitimately influence science 5 .…”

Section: Toward a Rawlsian Solution To The New Demarcation Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Rawlsian Solution to the New Demarcation Problem

Cabrera

2022

Can. J. of Philosophy

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In the last two decades, a robust consensus has emerged among philosophers of science, whereby political, ethical, or social values must play some role in scientific inquiry, and that the ‘value-free ideal’ is thus a misguided conception of science. However, the question of how to distinguish, in a principled way, which values may legitimately influence science remains. This question, which has been dubbed the ‘new demarcation problem,’ has until recently received comparatively less attention from philosophers of science. In this paper, I appeal to Rawls’s theory of justice (1971) on the basis of which I defend a Rawlsian solution to the new demarcation problem. As I argue, the Rawlsian solution places plausible constraints on which values ought to influence scientific inquiry, and, moreover, can be fruitfully applied to concrete cases to determine how the conflicting interests of stakeholders should be balanced. After considering and responding to the objection that Rawls’s theory of justice applies only to the “basic structure” of society, I compare the Rawlsian solution to some other approaches to the new demarcation problem, especially those that emphasize democratic criteria.

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Does democracy require value-neutral science? Analyzing the legitimacy of scientific information in the political sphere

Cited by 19 publications

References 28 publications

Diversifying science: comparing the benefits of citizen science with the benefits of bringing more women into science

Diversifying science: comparing the benefits of citizen science with the benefits of bringing more women into science

The Limits of Democratizing Science: When Scientists Should Ignore the Public

A Rawlsian Solution to the New Demarcation Problem

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