Does Descartes Deny Consciousness to Animals?

Thomas, Janice

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00331.x

Cited by 9 publications

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“… 7 For a discussion of animal pain, see for example Allen ( 2004 ) and Rollin ( 2011 ). The view that nonhuman animals cannot experience pain, sometimes incorrectly associated with Descartes (Cottingham 1978 ; Harrison 1992 ; Thomas 2006 ), does currently not find any defenders of note (with the often cited exception of Harrison 1991 ). Although Peter Carruthers admits that (some) nonhuman animals can experience pain and other suffering, he has argued that it has no moral significance because their pain is non-conscious (Carruthers 1992 , p. 192).…”

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The Emergence and Development of Animal Research Ethics: A Review with a Focus on Nonhuman Primates

Árnason

2020

Sci Eng Ethics

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The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term "animal research ethics". Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview of the development of the field and a discussion of relevant theoretical ethical frameworks, I consider two of these issues, namely autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and harms and benefits on the other hand. My concern is with philosophical and ethical issues, rather than animal research oversight. I focus my discussion on nonhuman primates, as the most plausible nonhuman candidates for this approach. I conclude that the approach, although promising, depends strongly on the moral status of nonhuman research subjects.

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The Emergence and Development of Animal Research Ethics: A Review with a Focus on Nonhuman Primates

Árnason

2020

Sci Eng Ethics

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“…See alsoBaker and Morris (1996),Sutton (2000),Gaukroger (2003),Morris (2003), andThomas (2006). For defenses of the traditional view that Cartesian animals are mindless seeSencerz (1990),Wee (2005), andHatfield (2008).6 For the letter to More, see AT V 278/CSMK 366.…”

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Descartes on the Animal Within, and the Animals Without

Thomas

2020

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Descartes held that animals are material automata without minds. However, this raises a puzzle. Descartes’s argument for this doctrine relies on the claims that animals lack language and general intelligence. But these claims seem compatible with the view that animals have minds. As a solution to this puzzle, I defend what I call the introspective-analogical interpretation. According to this interpretation, Descartes employs introspection to show that certain human behaviors do not depend on thought but rather on automatic bodily processes. Descartes then argues that animal behavior resembles only those behaviors that are automatic in humans. Analogy thus supports the view that the behaviors of animals do not depend on thought but are, rather, automatic. And if animal behavior is automatic, then animals are best regarded as automata.

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“…In what follows, it can be assumed that my discussion is restricted to European philosophy.2 The most comprehensive work to date on the reception of Descartes's views on animals in the early modern period isRosenfield (1941). For some of the recent literature on Descartes's views on animals seeCottingham (1978) Radner and Radner (1989),Sencerz (1990),Baker and Morris (1996),Sutton (2000),Gaukroger (2000),Morris (2000),Wee (2005),Thomas (2006), andHatfield (2008).3 The French terms are ' connoissances sensibles' and ' connoissances intellectuelles.' I have chosen to translate ' connoissance' as 'perception' rather than 'knowledge' for two reasons.…”

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Animals and Cartesian Consciousness: Pardies vs. the Cartesians

Thomas

2020

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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The Cartesian view that animals are automata sparked a major controversy in early modern European philosophy. This paper studies an early contribution to this controversy. I provide an interpretation of an influential objection to Cartesian animal automatism raised by Ignace-Gaston Pardies (1636-1673). Pardies objects that the Cartesian arguments show only that animals lack 'intellectual perception' but do not show that animals lack 'sensible perception.' According to Pardies, the difference between these two types of perception is that the former is reflexive such that we both perceive an object and the perception itself, whereas sensible perception lacks this reflexivity. This notion of sensible perception was criticized by the Cartesian Antoine Dilly for violating the doctrine that all thought is conscious. However, I argue that sensible perceptions are not unconscious for Pardies. Rather, they are conscious perceptions that are unaccompanied by a kind of reflexive perception that is constitutive of attention. Moreover, I argue that when understood in this way Pardies raises a compelling objection to Cartesian animal automatists.

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Does Descartes Deny Consciousness to Animals?

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

The Emergence and Development of Animal Research Ethics: A Review with a Focus on Nonhuman Primates

The Emergence and Development of Animal Research Ethics: A Review with a Focus on Nonhuman Primates

Descartes on the Animal Within, and the Animals Without

Animals and Cartesian Consciousness: Pardies vs. the Cartesians

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