2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00210.x
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Does fiscal redistribution discourage local public investment?

Abstract: This paper studies the determinants of regional (oblast-level) public investment in transitional Russia, focusing on the effects of federal fiscal redistribution. A model of local government expenditure in the presence of regional asymmetries shows that revenue redistribution from wealthy to poor regions discourages local public investment. Random-and fixed-effects estimation of regional panel data for 1994-97 supports the existence of a disincentive effect from fiscal redistribution on regional public investm… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…For regions in Russia over the period 1994-1997, Matheson (2005 points out that horizontal redistribution leads to a decrease in local public investment. Moreover, the strength of this relationship is found to be dependent on administrative status (republics vs. non-republics) and regional wealth.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For regions in Russia over the period 1994-1997, Matheson (2005 points out that horizontal redistribution leads to a decrease in local public investment. Moreover, the strength of this relationship is found to be dependent on administrative status (republics vs. non-republics) and regional wealth.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the differences have been formally abolished, they may still have an effect on the allocation of transfers. Many researchers document that 21 ethnic republics have been favoured in the form of larger subsidies, permission to retain a higher share of tax collections and special decrees granting economic benefits (Martinez‐Vazquez and Boex, 2001; Matheson, 2005). I also control for regional population, as it may be the case that big regions have better bargaining positions with the federal centre.…”
Section: Tactical Grants: Formulating Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Federal redistribution generates incentives for regions to under-invest. Thereby they can attract higher federal support (Dahlby, 1996;Matheson, 2005;Fenge and Wrede, 2004). However, this literature does not account for incentives arising in more sophisticated federal structures with more than two tiers of government.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%