Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries

Potrafke, Niklas

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9494-z

Cited by 161 publications

(102 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…I will briefly discuss two intriguing political economic 16 On the effects of trade, trade policy and domestic factors in union wage determination see, for example, Gaston and Trefler (1995). 17 This finding perfectly corresponds with research on product market deregulation (e.g., Heinemann 2007 andPotrafke 2010) and economic reforms (e.g., Gassebner et al 2011). determinants: honesty indicators and, although touched upon in this paper, government ideology.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 64%

Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries

Potrafke

2010

Rev World Econ

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This paper empirically investigates the influence of globalization on various aspects of labor market deregulation. I employ the data set by Bassanini and Duval (2006) The results suggest that globalization did neither influence the unemployment replacement rate, the unemployment benefit length, public expenditures on ALMP, the tax wedge, union density nor overall employment protection. In contrast, protection of regular employment contracts was diminished when globalization was proceeding rapidly. In fact, domestic aspects, such as unemployment and government ideology are more important determinants of labor market institutions and deregulation processes in OECD countries than globalization. For this reason, working conditions of unskilled workers are not likely to deteriorate and the jobs of unskilled workers are not likely to disappear in the course of globalization. All this is, of course, not to insinuate that globalization has any benign influence on labor market institutions.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 64%

Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries

Potrafke

2010

Rev World Econ

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“…1 Scholars have examined to what extent and in which policy areas government ideology has influenced economic policy (e.g., Alesina et al 1997;Imbeau et al 2001;Pickering and Rockey 2011;Ferris and Voia 2011). The results suggest that rightwing governments have typically been more active in privatizing and deregulating product markets (see, for example, Bortolotti et al 2004;Potrafke 2010).…”

Section: Policies and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The size and scope of government in the US states: does party ideology matter?

Bjørnskov

Potrafke

2013

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (2011) that considers spatial and temporal differences in Democratic and Republican Party ideology. We distinguish between three types of divided government: overall divided government, proposal division and approval division. The main result suggests that Republican governors have been more active in deregulating labor markets. We find that ideologyinduced policies were counteracted under overall divided government and proposal division. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: D72, H70, O51.

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“…First, partisan ideology influences the government's preferences (Boix, 2000;Garrett, 1998;Potrafke, 2010). If a left-wing government replaces a right-wing government, it may terminate technology programs that the right-wing government supported, such as nuclear research.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative fractionalization and partisan shifts to the left increase the volatility of public energy R&D expenditures

Baccini¹,

Urpelainen²

2012

Energy Policy

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This article shows that legislative fractionalization and leftward (but not rightward) partisan shifts increase the volatility of public R&D expenditures in new energy technologies. We develop a highly accurate estimator for public energy R&D expenditures, and examine deviations from the estimated values using data for member states of the International Energy Agency, 1981Agency, -2007. Given that unpredictable fluctuation in public spending on new energy technology reduces the positive effect of such spending on innovation, our empirical analyses imply that countries with fractionalized legislatures can improve the performance of their energy technology programs through institutional mechanisms that reduce the volatility of public spending.Similarly, the results indicate that left-wing and right-wing governments can improve the performance of public technology programs through agreements that distribute gains in such a fashion that partisan shifts do not cause spending cuts. Contravening the conventional wisdom, we also find that public energy R&D is unusually stable in the United States.

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Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries

Abstract: Product market deregulation, Government ideology, Panel data, D72, L50, P16, C23,

Cited by 161 publications

References 50 publications

Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries

Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries

The size and scope of government in the US states: does party ideology matter?

Legislative fractionalization and partisan shifts to the left increase the volatility of public energy R&D expenditures

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