Does group engagement with members constitute a “beneficial inefficiency”?

Abstract

This article explores the role of variations in organizational form in explaining levels of group access. Specifically, we test whether group forms incorporating more extensive engagement with members receive policy advantages. We develop and test a account of beneficial inefficiencies. Our account reasons that the costs of inefficient intraorganizational processes and practices associated with enhanced engagement with members are beneficial as they generate crucial “access goods”—specifically encompassing positions—that in turn receive enhanced policy benefits. The costs of intraorganizational practices allowing members to engage more thoroughly in decision making are thus beneficial inefficiencies. We test this proposition using data on the Australian interest group system. Using the tools of cluster analysis, we identify three forms, each varying in respect of the inefficiencies they embody. Our multivariate analysis finds strong support for the account of beneficial inefficiencies: groups with the most inefficient organizational model receiving the greatest policy access.

Prioritizing professionals? How the democratic and professionalized nature of interest groups shapes their degree of access to EU officials

“…The need for professionalized and technical expertise might be accentuated in the Commission, which as the bureaucratic institution in charge of developing policy proposals is mostly concerned about the technicalities that would make a proposal viable. We may find different results if we study more politicized venues, such as the legislative arena where there is a higher demand for political knowledge (Grömping and Halpin, 2019). In addition, the effects of these organizational dimensions and the ability to function as a transmission belt might work differently at the national level (see Berkhout et al, 2017).…”

“…Similarly, a recent research shows that the European representativeness and the organizational structure of European associations are related with access to administrative and political officials of the EU (Albareda and Braun, 2019). Finally, groups that invest more in member engagement receive positive benefits by way of a higher degree of access in the legislative arena (Grömping and Halpin, 2019) and are more likely to be political insiders (Heylen et al, 2020).…”

“…First, it builds upon previous work stressing the relevance of how groups are internally organized and the significant variation in that regard (Minkoff et al, 2008;Baroni et al, 2014;Fraussen, 2014;Halpin et al, 2018) by highlighting two critical functions of groups: member involvement for representation and organizational capacity to efficiently provide policy input. Second, by examining the effects of having representative and efficient structures on the number of meetings with EU officials, the paper contributes to the literature centered on interest groups' level of access to public officials (Binderkrantz and Christiansen, 2015;Fraussen et al, 2015;Rasmussen and Gross, 2015;Grömping and Halpin, 2019;Weiler et al, 2019). Third, the paper provides an evaluation of the democratic potential of policy insider groups, which is crucial to assess how governance systems function.…”

Can sport clubs be represented? Pre-packed policy advocacy and the trade-offs for democratic responsiveness

“…The distinction between attached and objective interests is significant because it speaks to the different ways in which advocacy organisations may claim access to public policy process, and the grounds on which these claims are likely to be evaluated by decision-makers (Halpin 2010, Grömping andHalpin 2019). From this perspective, the systemic internal democracy of representatives of attached interests is paramount, because it can be used to vouch for the 'authenticity' of the content of advocacy, thereby legitimating access.…”

“…The internal democracy of voluntary organisations is thus an 'access good' that bestows legitimacy on public policies. Access to policy processes is exchanged for information on the interests of the citizens that form the membership of voluntary organisations, presumably channelled through organisations' internal democracy and conveyed in advocacy (Bouwen 2002, Halpin 2010, Grömping and Halpin 2019. Paired with the cultural and political significance of sport, not to mention its large proportional memberships base in many countries, the assumption that membership structures engender an ability to transfer citizens' interests into the political system suggests that sport federations may be particularly likely to be offered a 'seat at the table' in political processes where they are expected to carry out democratically accountable interest representation.…”