Does language matter for implicit theory of mind? The effects of epistemic verb training on implicit and explicit false-belief understanding

Juan, Valerie San; Astington, Janet Wilde

doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.12.003

Cited by 16 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Concerning the association with theory of mind skills, our findings confirmed previous research attesting the direct effects of children’s language abilities on their capacity to reason about others’ mental states (Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Ruffman et al, 2002; Milligan et al, 2007; San Juan and Astington, 2017). We know from the literature that language abilities are a crucial tool for children in their everyday lives and benefit their overall development in multiple ways.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…Strong positive associations have also been found between language abilities and theory of mind (Meins et al, 2013; Imuta et al, 2016). Furthermore, language development has been found to predict the acquisition of theory of mind (Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Ruffman et al, 2002; San Juan and Astington, 2017). A meta-analysis by Milligan et al (2007) explored the relationship between language and false-belief understanding in children younger than 7 years.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We set out to advance existing knowledge concerning the patterns of association among emotion knowledge, theory of mind, and language in the early years, also controlling for age and gender. While language is known to be strongly associated with children’s acquisition of both emotion knowledge (de Rosnay et al, 2004; Vallotton and Ayoub, 2011; Strand et al, 2016) and understanding of others’ minds (Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Ruffman et al, 2002; Milligan et al, 2007; San Juan and Astington, 2017), the cumulative relationships among these variables have never been explored with younger children within a single comprehensive framework.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Emotion Knowledge, Theory of Mind, and Language in Young Children: Testing a Comprehensive Conceptual Model

et al. 2019

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Numerous studies suggest that both emotion knowledge and language abilities are powerfully related to young children’s theory of mind. Nonetheless, the magnitude and direction of the associations between language, emotion knowledge, and theory-of-mind performance in the first years of life are still debated. Hence, the aim of this study was to assess the direct effects of emotion knowledge and language on theory-of-mind scores in 2- and 3-year-old children. A sample of 139 children, aged between 24 and 47 months (M = 35.5 months; SD = 6.73), were directly administered measures of emotion knowledge, theory of mind, and language. We conducted structural equation modeling (SEM) to evaluate the effects of these variables within a single comprehensive framework, while also controlling for any effects of age and gender. The proposed structural equation model provided an excellent fit for the data, indicating that both children’s emotion knowledge, and their language ability had direct positive effects on theory of mind scores. In addition, age was found to wield statistically significant effects on all the variables under study, whereas gender was not significantly associated with any of them. These findings suggest the importance of fostering young children’s emotion knowledge and language ability with a view to enhancing their comprehension of mental states.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Emotion Knowledge, Theory of Mind, and Language in Young Children: Testing a Comprehensive Conceptual Model

et al. 2019

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“…Note that the use of the terms “explicit” and “implicit” in this sense differ slightly from their use in the wider Theory of Mind literature, which distinguishes between explicit tasks that require a verbal response about another individual’s mental states, and implicit tasks that infer the presence of the representation of another individual’s mental states based on non-verbal responses (see, for example, San Juan & Astington, 2017 ). Here, we are using the terms to refer to the task instructions and demands; that is, to describe whether participants are explicitly or implicitly required to take the perspective of the avatar throughout the task.…”

Section: The Dptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspective-taking is spontaneous but not automatic

O’Grady

Scott‐Phillips

Lavelle

et al. 2020

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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Data from a range of different experimental paradigms—in particular (but not only) the dot perspective task—have been interpreted as evidence that humans automatically track the perspective of other individuals. Results from other studies, however, have cast doubt on this interpretation, and some researchers have suggested that phenomena that seem like perspective-taking might instead be the products of simpler behavioural rules. The issue remains unsettled in significant part because different schools of thought, with different theoretical perspectives, implement the experimental tasks in subtly different ways, making direct comparisons difficult. Here, we explore the possibility that subtle differences in experimental method explain otherwise irreconcilable findings in the literature. Across five experiments we show that the classic result in the dot perspective task is not automatic (it is not purely stimulus-driven), but nor is it exclusively the product of simple behavioural rules that do not involve mentalising. Instead, participants do compute the perspectives of other individuals rapidly, unconsciously, and involuntarily, but only when attentional systems prompt them to do so (just as, for instance, the visual system puts external objects into focus only as and when required). This finding prompts us to clearly distinguish spontaneity from automaticity. Spontaneous perspective-taking may be a computationally efficient means of navigating the social world.

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“…In intervention programs based on a conversational approach, children who took part in targeted language activities displayed greater gains in performance on ToM tasks than children in a control group who received no linguistic training. For example, San Juan and Astington (2017) have recently reported that preschoolers’ performance on false-belief tasks significantly improves after they receive training in epistemic verbs. Similarly, encouraging preschoolers and school-age children to use emotion-state terms while discussing their own and others’ emotional experiences results in more advanced levels of EU ( Tenenbaum et al, 2008 ; Grazzani and Ornaghi, 2011 ; Ornaghi et al, 2015 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Relation Between Emotion Understanding and Theory of Mind in Children Aged 3 to 8: The Key Role of Language

et al. 2018

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Although a significant body of research has investigated the relationships among children’s emotion understanding (EU), theory of mind (ToM), and language abilities. As far as we know, no study to date has been conducted with a sizeable sample of both preschool and school-age children exploring the direct effect of EU on ToM when the role of language was evaluated as a potential exogenous factor in a single comprehensive model. Participants in the current study were 389 children (age range: 37–97 months, M = 60.79 months; SD = 12.66), to whom a False-Belief understanding battery, the Test of Emotion Comprehension, and the Peabody Test were administered. Children’s EU, ToM, and language ability (receptive vocabulary) were positively correlated. Furthermore, EU scores explained variability in ToM scores independently of participants’ age and gender. Finally, language was found to play a crucial role in both explaining variance in ToM scores and in mediating the relationship between EU and ToM. We discuss the theoretical and educational implications of these outcomes, particularly in relation to offering social and emotional learning programs through schools.

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Does language matter for implicit theory of mind? The effects of epistemic verb training on implicit and explicit false-belief understanding

Cited by 16 publications

References 31 publications

Emotion Knowledge, Theory of Mind, and Language in Young Children: Testing a Comprehensive Conceptual Model

Emotion Knowledge, Theory of Mind, and Language in Young Children: Testing a Comprehensive Conceptual Model

Perspective-taking is spontaneous but not automatic

The Relation Between Emotion Understanding and Theory of Mind in Children Aged 3 to 8: The Key Role of Language

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