Does managerial myopia exacerbate firms excessive financialization? Evidence from Malaysia

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine the influence of managerial myopia on the excessive financialization behavior of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach Through a sample of 313 firms from 2015 to 2021, the author examine whether managerial myopia promotes or inhibits corporate financialization. The author uses ordinary least squares and Logit as the baseline models and addresses potential endogeneity through the dynamic-panel generalized method of moments. The results are also robust to alternative measures of financialization and managerial myopia. Findings The results show a significant positive effect of managerial myopia on the excessive financialization of enterprises. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the impact of managerial myopia on the over-financialization of enterprises is more prominent in periods of low economic policy uncertainty. However, the relationship between excessive financialization and managerial myopia is weakened in the presence of female chief executive officers. Practical implications The empirical results have useful policy implications. First, firms should establish scientific managerial assessment and supervision systems to avoid excessive financial investment behavior by myopic managers caused by assessments that place too much emphasis on short-term performance. Second, regulators and policymakers should encourage firms to appoint women to top management positions, which may inhibit short-sighted financialization behavior. Finally, the regulatory authorities should undertake the necessary measures driving companies to disclose the investment direction of the funds so that shareholders and investors can understand the use direction of the funds in a timely manner, which can effectively prevent the economy “from the real to the virtual” and promote the development of the real economy. Originality/value This paper expands the existing research on corporate financialization behavior and provides a new theoretical basis for the underlying factors of excessive financialization. It studies the influence of corporate financialization from the perspective of short-run managerial actions and deepens the understanding of managerial myopia and companies’ financialization levels.