“…Furthermore, the impact of mutual fund activism on corporate innovation can vary across institutional environments, which in this case includes state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). On the one hand, Mamatzakis and Xu (2021) and Lin et al (2016) claim that companies with a high level of government ownership tend to perform better than non‐SOEs and can provide effective monitoring on corporate governance. On the other hand, some researchers argue that SOEs undermine corporate governance mechanisms (Chen et al, 2007; Chen, Li, et al, 2017) and point out that SOEs may lack the incentive to implement innovative strategies and spend less on R&D (Qin & Zhang, 2019; Yuan & Wen, 2018), as their performance criteria are relevant to those which are social‐based rather than economic‐based (Yuan & Wen, 2018).…”