2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00498.x
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Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain?

Abstract: We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck … Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
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“… As defined here, this version of nonconceptualism is a kind of “state nonconceptualism,” a view recently endorsed and defended by Tim Crane (). On this view, one can have a perception that the ball is shiny even if one lacks the concept of shininess (see Connolly ). Some have argued that the conceptualism/nonconceptualism debate ought not to be about states, but about contents (see Heck , 485 and Speaks , 359–62).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… As defined here, this version of nonconceptualism is a kind of “state nonconceptualism,” a view recently endorsed and defended by Tim Crane (). On this view, one can have a perception that the ball is shiny even if one lacks the concept of shininess (see Connolly ). Some have argued that the conceptualism/nonconceptualism debate ought not to be about states, but about contents (see Heck , 485 and Speaks , 359–62).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%