2018
DOI: 10.3758/s13420-018-0341-2
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Dogs do not demonstrate a human-like bias to defer to communicative cues

Abstract: Human children and domesticated dogs learn from communicative cues, such as pointing, in highly similar ways. In two experiments, we investigate whether dogs are biased to defer to these cues in the same way as human children. We tested dogs on a cueing task similar to one previously conducted in human children. Dogs received conflicting information about the location of a treat from a Guesser and a Knower, who either used communicative cues (i.e., pointing; Experiments 1 and 2), non-communicative physical cue… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
5
1

Relationship

2
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 62 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…For example, several scholars argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying metacognition and those necessary for monitoring the mental states of others are dependent on one another in some manner (Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happé, 1999; Goldman, 2006). Although it is still unclear whether any animals possess the full set of theory of mind abilities that humans possess (see reviews in Apperly, 2010; Bräuer, 2014; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Emery & Clayton, 2009), nonhuman primates, dogs, and scrub jays all demonstrate an ability to track the perceptual access and knowledge of other agents, which is one component of what researchers have referred to as a theory of mind (nonhuman primates: Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, Goddu, & Santos, 2011; Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006; Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 2011; scrub jays: Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2004, 2005, 2006; Emery & Clayton, 2001; domesticated dogs: Bräuer et al, 2004; Call, Bräuer, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2003; Catala, Mang, Wallis, & Huber, 2017; Cooper et al, 2003; Johnston, Huang, & Santos, 2018; Kaminski, Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Kaminski, Pitsch, & Tomasello, 2013; Maginnity & Grace, 2014; Topál, Miklósi, & Manyik, 2004). Therefore, it is notable that, prior to the findings of the current study, the species that seem to think about and act upon the knowledge of others also show similar aptitude when thinking about and acting on their own knowledge.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, several scholars argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying metacognition and those necessary for monitoring the mental states of others are dependent on one another in some manner (Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Happé, 1999; Goldman, 2006). Although it is still unclear whether any animals possess the full set of theory of mind abilities that humans possess (see reviews in Apperly, 2010; Bräuer, 2014; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Emery & Clayton, 2009), nonhuman primates, dogs, and scrub jays all demonstrate an ability to track the perceptual access and knowledge of other agents, which is one component of what researchers have referred to as a theory of mind (nonhuman primates: Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, Goddu, & Santos, 2011; Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006; Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 2011; scrub jays: Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2004, 2005, 2006; Emery & Clayton, 2001; domesticated dogs: Bräuer et al, 2004; Call, Bräuer, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2003; Catala, Mang, Wallis, & Huber, 2017; Cooper et al, 2003; Johnston, Huang, & Santos, 2018; Kaminski, Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Kaminski, Pitsch, & Tomasello, 2013; Maginnity & Grace, 2014; Topál, Miklósi, & Manyik, 2004). Therefore, it is notable that, prior to the findings of the current study, the species that seem to think about and act upon the knowledge of others also show similar aptitude when thinking about and acting on their own knowledge.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It could be argued that this finding demonstrates that when ostensive cues are present, dogs will interpret a point as an intentional act meant to convey important information. Further, there is some suggestion that dogs may avoid following the points of individuals who did not have visual access to the baiting of a location and individuals who point to a location opposite of a location in which the dog has seen an object placed (Johnston, Huang, & Santos, 2018;Pelgrim et al, 2021;Szetei et al, 2003), indicating a level of flexibility in point-following based the likelihood of the pointer to provide accurate information. Yet, it is also possible that no attribution of intention is made, and instead, dogs have a cognitive system that allows for past experience of others' behavior to be organized by heuristics (or sets of related rules) that allow them to recognize causally relevant aspects of current behavior (eye gaze, use of 'names') and respond in a way that optimizes reward (see Penn & Povinelli, 2013, who present this model in relation to theory of mind).…”
Section: The Interpretation Of the Human Pointmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Perhaps most notably, dogs have some aspects of a "Theory of Mind" and are able to make inferences about some human mental states (163). In particular, dogs are able to interpret a human's visual perspective [i.e., understand what a human can see (164,165)] and they also seem to expect that humans will remember what they have seen [i.e., have knowledge of what they have seen (166)(167)(168)]. Moreover, dogs respond to human intentions and can identify when a human intends to communicate with them (169) and when humans are performing goal-directed actions (170).…”
Section: Review Of the Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%