Domain-specific experience and dual-process thinking

Purcell, Zoë A.; Wastell, Colin; Sweller, Naomi

doi:10.1080/13546783.2020.1793813

Cited by 35 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…The short explanation given after the first problem thus boosted participants' performance on the second ('deliberation-allowed') problem. This result replicates the training effect observed in previous studies (Claidière et al, 2017;Hoover & Healy, 2017;Morewedge et al, 2015;Purcell et al, 2020;Trouche et al, 2014). After a short explanation, the majority of reasoners manages to solve the bat-and-ball problem.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 88%

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

et al. 2021

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 88%

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

et al. 2021

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“…performance [29,42]. This has been found for tests between participant groups (experienced versus inexperienced [29]) or where participants were allowed multiple attempts, given training or an intervention, or with varying feedback protocols [30,49,51,55,[85][86][87][88][89].…”

Section: Materials and Methods: Natural Resource Managers And Studentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, task performance studies that test domain experience, which is often used to understand expertise and where it is assumed that individuals with greater experience employ more powerful heuristics than novices [84,85], have shown that domain experience does not influence task performance [29,42]. This has been found for tests between participant groups (experienced versus inexperienced [29]) or where participants were allowed multiple attempts, given training or an intervention, or with varying feedback protocols [30,49,51,55,[85][86][87][88][89].…”

Section: Environmental and Contextual Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Results of Beer Game Trials Played by Natural Resource Managers Versus Students: Does Age Influence Ordering Decisions?

Turner

Goodman

Machen

et al. 2020

Systems

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Systems involving agriculture and natural resources (AGNR) management and representing integrations of biologic, geologic, socio-economic, and climatic characteristics are incredibly complex. AGNR managers purport using a systems-oriented mental model while many observed management and policy strategies remain linear or symptom-driven. To improve AGNR professionals’ systems thinking abilities, two programs, the King Ranch® Institute for Ranch Management at Texas A&M University-Kingsville (KRIRM) and the Honors College at South Dakota State University (SDSUHC), implemented the famous Production Distribution Simulation Game (a.k.a. the Beer Game) into their programs beginning in 2003 and 2011. A Beer Game database consisting of 10 years of trials or over 270 individual players was compared to seminal work in the literature as well as to one another. We found that AGNR managers and students performed worse than players in a seminal Beer Game study. More interestingly, we found that younger players adapted more readily to inventory surpluses by reducing the order rates and effective inventories significantly when compared to older players (p < 0.10 for retailer and distributors, and p < 0.05 for wholesales and factories). We substantiated our results to those in more recent studies of age-related decision-making and in the context of common learning disabilities. Lastly, we discuss some implications of such decision-making on 21st century AGNR problems and encourage AGNR disciplines to better integrate system dynamics-based education and collaboration in order to better prepare for such complex issues.

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“…Similarly, training participants in the logical necessity concept using verbal explanations and Venn diagrams has been successful in increasing the accuracy in evaluating logical (i.e., necessary) and pseudo-logical (i.e., possible) syllogisms (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009). Finally, Stephens et al (2020) In the same vein, Purcell et al (2020) presented participants with two training phases, each followed by a post-training CRT block. In the training phases, participants were asked to solve a series of structurally similar CRT problems and received explanations of the mathematical and logical structures of each problem preceded by accuracy feedback.…”

Section: The Effect Of Training On Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical intuitions or matching heuristic? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments

Ghasemi

Handley

Stephens³

2022

Preprint

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Are people able to successfully evaluate logic intuitively, without engaging in deliberative thinking? Recent research has revealed that when individuals are asked to simply evaluate the believability of deductively valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid arguments at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments – the “logic-belief effect” – is considered to be evidence of intuitive logic or logical intuitions. However, a recent study challenged the intuitive logic interpretation by demonstrating that ‘pseudo-logical’ arguments, such as affirmation of the consequent, where there is a compelling but invalid inference invited, interfere with contrasting belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do, and hence, the logic-belief effect may have nothing to do with evaluating logic itself. Instead, this finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions leads to such interference. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments (N = 332), we examined whether training in logic would selectively reduce the endorsement of invalid arguments under logic instructions whilst maintaining the impact of invalid inferences on belief judgments, where a matching cue could drive responses. We instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, whereby simple considerations of proposition-matching rather than logic assessment underly previous evidence for intuitive logic.

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Domain-specific experience and dual-process thinking

Cited by 35 publications

References 45 publications

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

Results of Beer Game Trials Played by Natural Resource Managers Versus Students: Does Age Influence Ordering Decisions?

Logical intuitions or matching heuristic? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments

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