2015
DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2015.1066414
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Domestic actors and agendas in Chinese aid policy

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Cited by 24 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…Articles included in this special edition focus on the domestic politics of aid within a specific country setting: Varrall (2015) examines China, Kim (2015) South Korea, Tubilewicz (2015) Taiwan, Jain (2015) Japan and Rosser (2015) Australia. Four key general findings emerge from these papers.…”
Section: Key Findingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Articles included in this special edition focus on the domestic politics of aid within a specific country setting: Varrall (2015) examines China, Kim (2015) South Korea, Tubilewicz (2015) Taiwan, Jain (2015) Japan and Rosser (2015) Australia. Four key general findings emerge from these papers.…”
Section: Key Findingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is reiterated by the domestic context in which China's foreign aid policy is shaped. Due to the lack of an independent foreign aid agency, line ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), are the primary government actors that determine the allocation of ODA flows (Dornan and Brant 2014;Varrall 2016;Zhang and Smith 2017). Although economic interests are thus prominent in the decision-making process of aid allocation, China's distribution of development assistance ultimately must adhere to its foreign policy goals as the 'MFA has "veto power" over whether aid serves China's foreign policy interests' Smith 2017, 2335).…”
Section: Foreign Policy Interestsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…MOFCOM, however, is ostensibly primarily responsible for China's international economic relations, and typically uses IDF to support Chinese commercial endeavours. 42 Most research suggests MOFCOM is dominant, disregarding the MFA except when it needs a 'diplomatic problem-solver' when things go wrong. 43 Many other national-level agencies are also involved.…”
Section: China's Fragmented Idf Domainmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it is unclear whether IDF falls within the remit of the foreign affairs LSG, the finance and economy LSG, the BRI LSG or-as seems likely, given the usual tussles-all of them. 55 The potential overlap is characteristic of the partystate's fragmentation: Lampton remarks that '[LSGs] too need coordination'. 56 In the State Council, MOFCOM, MFA and MOF established a liaison mechanism in 2008 which in 2011 was formalized as the Inter-Agency Foreign Aid Coordination Mechanism.…”
Section: International Affairs 94: 3 2018mentioning
confidence: 99%