Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases

Gordon, Michael

doi:10.1086/241205

Cited by 56 publications

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“…Among French historians, Poincaré is largely pictured as playing the nationalism card after 1912, although what was most notable here was that the government did not back down in the crisis for fear of provoking unrest; see especially Keiger (1983), , and Hayne (1993). In the British case, Steiner (1977) is explicit in rejecting the diversionary arguments, but see also Gordon (1974), Kennedy (1980), and Chamberlain (1988). Also note that Italian governments under Giolitti's influence had also turned away from the highly nationalistic foreign policies of earlier governments (see Thayer, 1964;C.…”

Section: Value Trade-offs Under Threatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Decision Making Matter?

Hagan

2001

Int Studies Review

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Section: Value Trade-offs Under Threatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Decision Making Matter?

Hagan

2001

Int Studies Review

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“…In many authoritarian regimes, for instance, the leadership is quite autonomous from societal forces. And in praetorian polities the institutional framework may not effectively assimilate struggles between competing groups; thus narrow (economic or noneconomic) interest groups with disproportionate influence can capture national policy and shift it away from the preferences of median economic interests (Huntington, 1968:81-2, 195-8;Gordon, 1974;Snyder, 1990Snyder, , 1991.…”

Section: When and How Domestic Political Institutions Mattermentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

Papayoanou¹

1997

International Studies Quarterly

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To account for variance in great powers' responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states' beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.Realist balance of power theorists have long argued that states tend to oppose threatening powers in the international system. This balancing behavior is seen to be an optimal response by states and conducive to international stability (cf. Gulick,

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“…In one case at least, that of Great Britain, the answer may well be negative. In comparative analyses of the domestic roots of the war in Germany and England, both Michael Gordon (1974) and Donald Lammers (1973) have made a strong case for the primacy of foreign policy in England. Gordon (1974: 200) has written: "The fact is that the social base for powerful reactionary or counterrevolutionary mass movements was built into the very structures of Imperial Germany; in Britain, by contrast, it was almost wholly lacking."…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Historian and Linkage Politics: Arno Mayer

Fry

Gilbert

1982

International Studies Quarterly

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Wiley-Blackwell andThe International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Studies Quarterly.While linkage politics has been a popular topic for both political scientists and historians, cross-fertilization has been meager. Indeed, there has been a studied indifference to interdisciplinary effort. By examining the work of a single historian, Arno Mayer, the authors explore the possibility of a more meaningful dialogue between historians and social scientists. Clearly, the rigor of social science as well as an imaginative and in-depth analysis of European history can be combined to stimulate and enrich our theoretical understanding of how domestic and international politics are related. Professor Mayer's work is evaluated in some detail and critiqued, but always with an eye to seeing how his writings relate to various approaches to international politics.The exploration of how national and international systems and processes affect each other has always been a concern of historians, political philosophers, and lawyers. There can be no question of the significance of linkage politics in its various forms and manifestations, and in the late 1960s James Rosenau, perhaps more than anyone else, brought to the attention of political scientists the need for systematic study of national/international linkages. Too many students of international affairs seemed to study the international system as if it were detached from events taking place in individual polities, while decision-425 426 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 1. Of course, many political scientists use historical data with success; for example, Richard Rosecrance (1963).

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Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases

Cited by 56 publications

References 0 publications

Does Decision Making Matter?

Does Decision Making Matter?

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

A Historian and Linkage Politics: Arno Mayer

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