Domination and Disobedience: Protest, Coercion and the Limits of an Appeal to Justice

Abstract

I offer a conceptual framework for assessing the normative legitimacy of coercive disobedience—involving threats, disruption, force, and deceit—by social movements. A standard liberal view is that while coercion may be required to resist authoritarian regimes, it is illegitimate in a democratic state since it conflicts with majority rule and mutual respect. In restricting disobedience to a form of moral persuasion, this perspective neglects how social power and material interests can distort the conditions for open, fair deliberation. I offer a principled defense of coercive disobedience, not only in repressive states but in plausibly democratic societies. I argue that coercion can be justified on democratic republican grounds as a means to collectively contest objectionable forms of political domination. The use of coercion can be justified as asurrogatetool of political action for those who lack effective participation rights; as aremedialtool to counteract the dominating influence of powerful actors over the process of democratic will formation, and as amobilizationaltool to maintain participation and discipline in collective action. I conclude by proposing democratic constraints on the use of coercive tactics designed to offset the potential movements themselves become a source of arbitrary power.

The ethics of climate activism

“…The first argument starts from the premise that climate policymaking is typically dominated by obstructionist corporate influence, and is therefore largely undemocratic. Cost‐levying climate protests, especially when directed against obstructing corporations, can in this context work as a counteracting force, partially restoring the equality of power that democracy requires (Aitchison, 2018, p. 674). This argument is less strong, however, when cost‐levying climate protests target not corporations but governments themselves (Garcia‐Gibson, 2021).…”

Self-harm in immigration detention: political, not (just) medical

“…As a general rule, persuasive methods of achieving political change that rely on reason and argument are preferred over coercion, since such methods respect the autonomy of opponents and the authority of democratic decisions.9 F 10 Yet a clear democratic justification can be given for the use of coercion in this case as a means to counteract damaging forms of political domination that deprive people of any adequate means of institutional change. This is particularly true of 'forms of political domination that are intense (with damaging effects on the life chances of some group or future group of persons) and entrenched (distorting the conditions under which appeals to reason are effective)' (48). Many would accept that there is a moral justification for coercive protest by citizens, such as strikes and boycotts, in response to certain kinds of injustice or else to remedy the defects of a closed and unresponsive democratic process.…”

Unruly kids? Conceptualizing and defending youth disobedience

“…This is because it counteracts political inertia (Markovits, 2005) and reduces the extent to which receiving popular uptake is about luck (Lefkowitz, 2007). Under realistic conditions of power inequality, furthermore, civil disobedience can help disempowered groups have a say (Aitchison, 2018: 668; Celikates, 2019; Markovits, 2005: 1922–1923). Disobedient activism can be an especially important democratic remedy regarding environmental issues, where it can help further deliberation (Von Essen, 2016) 9 and imagination of societal alternatives (Dow, 2018).…”