DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3
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Don’t Clog the Queue! Circuit Clogging and Mitigation in P2P Anonymity Schemes

Abstract: Abstract. At Oakland 2005, Murdoch and Danezis described an attack on the Tor anonymity service that recovers the nodes in a Tor circuit, but not the client. We observe that in a peer-to-peer anonymity scheme, the client is part of the circuit and thus the technique can be of greater significance in this setting. We experimentally validate this conclusion by showing that "circuit clogging" can identify client nodes using the MorphMix peer-to-peer anonymity protocol. We also propose and empirically validate the… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…More recently, Evans et al [14] improved Murdoch and Danezis's attack so as to practically de-anonymise Tor's users in currently deployed system. A similar attack against MorphMix [29] was recently described by Mclachlan and Hopper [21], proving wrong the previously held view that MorphMix is robust against such attacks [34]. Finally, a congestion attack is used by Hopper et al [18] to estimate the latency between the source of a message and its first relay in Tor.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…More recently, Evans et al [14] improved Murdoch and Danezis's attack so as to practically de-anonymise Tor's users in currently deployed system. A similar attack against MorphMix [29] was recently described by Mclachlan and Hopper [21], proving wrong the previously held view that MorphMix is robust against such attacks [34]. Finally, a congestion attack is used by Hopper et al [18] to estimate the latency between the source of a message and its first relay in Tor.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Recent work [14,18,[21][22][23] shows that such systems are vulnerable to so-called congestion attacks, which intuitively work as follows. Assume that the initiator selects a path which contains a corrupt user as the exit node.…”
Section: On the Security Of The Onion Forwarding Versionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Ngan et al [38] previously proposed a system in which Tor directory servers actively measure the performance of relays and note the "best" relays in the directory with a "gold star". This scheme introduces security vulnerabilities: the anonymity set of relays is significantly reduced since gold star relays can be distinguished from regular relays and the changing membership of the gold star set leads to an intersection attack [20,28,33,35].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A variety of attacks [20,28,33,35] make it difficult to design a secure solution with minimal loss of anonymity. In particular, bandwidth accounting mechanisms that give better service to relays that volunteer more bandwidth [38] in some cases significantly decrease the anonymity set of relays receiving better service, and in others [3] unintentionally allow an adversary to link relays to the same circuit.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%