Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation

Abstract

The notion that through increased state cooperation and dependency, national divisions can be overcome and peace can be secured, is at the core of European integration. Political elites often refer to the devastations of the Second World War (WWII) as a way to convey the added value of European cooperation today. Do references to the devastations of WWII enhance public support for European cooperation today? By presenting evidence from survey experiments conducted in the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the Great Britain) in July 2017, this study suggest that they do, albeit only when it comes to financial assistance for other member states in dire economic need. References to the devastations of WWII do not make respondents more willing to support free movement of people or the establishment of a European army. These findings suggest that reminding people of the devastations of WWII triggers a largely transactional response among the public: a willingness to provide financial support, but nothing more. This evidence suggests that securing public support for free movement of people or European security cooperation through historical rhetoric might be difficult to achieve.

Collective Identities and the Integration of Core State Powers: Introduction to the Special Issue

“…From this point onwards, we move away from a sector‐specific perspective, to explore the effects of long‐term historical processes and historical memories in the process of identity formation, both within and outside Europe. In the seventh article of the collection, Catherine de Vries () explores experimentally to what extent exposure to frames that explicitly recall World War II affect respondents’ preferences for cooperation in different fields, following benchmarking theory. Her main results indicate that exposure to negative memories increases support for cooperation when it comes to economic and financial aid, but does not substantially increase such support on free movement or defence (in the latter case, with the exception of the UK).…”

EU‐27 Public Opinion on Brexit†

“… 9 This omnibus has been used by other researchers (see De Vries, 2017 , 2018 , 2019 ; Karstens, 2019 ). De Vries ( 2018 , p. 66, footnote 6) notes that the demographic background of EuroPulse survey respondents shows very little difference from nationally representative surveys.…”

In Search of Lost Time: Memory‐framing, Bilateral Identity‐making, and European Security

“…Borrowing the language of the Introduction in this issue (Kuhn and Nicoli, ), which follows Genschel and Jachtenfuchs' work on core state powers, we show that some memory frames lend themselves to policy‐based integration, while others lead to resource‐based integration. Although these two kinds of power are not mutually exclusive, we argue that framing memory around reconciliation (that is, where the actors involved were in an antagonistic relationship previously) enables the integration of state policies, symbols and institutions (policy‐based powers), while framing memory around lost individual powers emphasizes state capabilities, capacities and joint actions (resource‐based powers).…”

“…Our argument assumes that collective security and defence identity‐making is a top‐down process that rests on memory frames. These memory frames might trigger different responses among the political elite and the public (see De Vries, ). Despite broad support, public opinion never played much of a role in pushing leaders to share or pool sovereignty in the military realm (Wagner, ).…”