Donor Government Ideology and Aid Bypass

Allen, Susan H.; Flynn, Michael E.

doi:10.1093/fpa/orx005

Cited by 34 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…This research theorizes that U.N. General Assembly voting patterns of aid recipients influence the amount of government‐mediated aid they receive from OECD donors. This article ties together past scholarship on aid channels (e.g., Milner, ; Dietrich, , ; Allen and Flynn, ), the influence of U.N. voting on foreign assistance (e.g., Derouen and Heo, ), and the strategic use of foreign aid by major power donor states (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, ). I find strong statistical support for the claim that while major power donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France condition government‐to‐government aid on recipients’ voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly, minor power OECD donors make no such connections.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 78%

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Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

Adhikari

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective This article explores the influence of aid recipient countries’ U.N. General Assembly voting on the amount of government‐to‐government economic assistance they receive from donor countries. I argue that major power donor states are swayed by recipient states’ voting records, while minor donors do not take U.N. General Assembly voting into consideration while formulating their aid policies. Method To explore the relationship, I utilize newly available, disaggregated foreign aid data. Result I find considerable empirical support for the assertion that dissimilar voting in the U.N. General Assembly results in less government‐to‐government aid from major power donors but has no effects on aid provided by minor power donors. Conclusion The findings show that foreign aid policies are based on donor countries’ position in the international system, where major power donors base their aid decisions mostly on strategic goals; minor power donors, on the other hand, prioritize recipient needs while formulating their foreign aid policies.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…I also control for recipient countries’ Former colony status. Alesina and Dollar () mention that countries provide more aid to their former colonies regardless of their poverty levels or regime type, and often via governmental channels (Allen and Flynn, ). I obtain a dichotomous measure of colonial history from Dietrich ().…”

Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

Adhikari

2019

Social Science Quarterly

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“…All these controls do not mean that this analysis can speak to what might occur in a randomly selected country, however. Donor aid delivery strategies are endogenous to features of recipient country environments (e.g., Allen & Flynn, ; Buntaine, Buch, and Parks ; Bush, ; Dietrich, ). Larger World Bank field offices and Country Directors are found in countries that are more strategically important to the organization.…”

Section: Empirics: Data and Hypothesis Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information, power, and location: World Bank staff decentralization and aid project success

Honig

2020

Governance

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Using data on World Bank staff identity and field placement, this article examines the relationship between staff presence in recipient countries and aid project performance. I find that merely placing World Bank staff in developing countries has little effect on the success of development projects. Greater field decision rights are, however, associated with differential project performance. In the most fragile states, the presence of senior personnel (World Bank Country Directors) is associated with greater project success after the “Strategic Compact” increased Country Directors' power. However—consistent with a bargaining model in which greater World Bank authority is in tension with recipient country direction of projects—as countries become less fragile, the net effect of the presence of Country Directors becomes negative. The impact of World Bank staff decentralization is mixed and appears to be driven primarily by the power of senior personnel in the field, not the ability of field staff to gather local information.

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“…Other studies which do not explicitly focus on partisanship and lack sophisticated indicators for ideology and partisanship do not report significant effects for the level of spending on development assistance (Fuchs et al, 2014: 190; Lundsgaarde et al, 2007; Round and Odedokun, 2004). In contrast, Tingley (2010: 45) reports a close relationship between party ideology and foreign aid to least developed countries (see also Allen and Flynn, 2018: 465; Brech and Potrafke, 2014; Greene and Licht, 2018: 296).…”

Section: Parties In Foreign and Security Policies: Reviewing The Litementioning

confidence: 99%

Bomb or build? How party ideologies affect the balance of foreign aid and defence spending

Wenzelburger

Böller

2019

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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This article contributes to a growing literature that questions the traditional ‘politics stops at the water’s edge’ paradigm. Left- and right-wing parties hold diverging ideologies and articulate specific party programmes regarding policy priorities in the realm of foreign and security affairs. The impact of partisan contestations over foreign policy priorities can be traced in defence and foreign aid spending. We understand this ‘bomb-or-build’-balance as two sides of a coin which shapes the international posture of democracies. Our quantitative analysis of 21 OECD countries (1988–2014) reveals that the ideological positions of the parties in government influence the relative importance of military expenditures versus foreign aid. The more the ideological position of a government is tilted towards the military (and against internationalism), the more the ‘bomb-or-build’-balance shifts in favour of military spending (and in disfavour of foreign aid).

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Donor Government Ideology and Aid Bypass

Cited by 34 publications

References 46 publications

Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

Information, power, and location: World Bank staff decentralization and aid project success

Bomb or build? How party ideologies affect the balance of foreign aid and defence spending

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