Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa

Norm collision in the European Union’s external policies: The case of European Union sanctions towards Rwanda

“…The prioritisation of development norms over human rights and democracy concerns identified in this article support what is referred to in the literature as the democracy-development dilemma (del Biondo, 2011Biondo, , 2015aBiondo, , 2015b. However, I extend the research beyond the existing literature by providing a theoretical account of this prioritisation.…”

“…A notable exception to the interest-based sanctions literature is the work of del Biondo (2011Biondo ( , 2015aBiondo ( , 2015b, who presents evidence that aid recipients that perform well in terms of social and economic development are excluded from EU sanctions. However this is only a first step, as no theoretical account is provided.…”

“…This hypothesis' validity would be indicated by actors not only evaluating to what extent a situation represents a breach of the conditionality principle as such (i.e., rigged elections as a breach of democracy), but also identifying other norms that are valid in the specific situation. What is often labelled 'development norms' are expected to be especially relevant, as they have been empirically shown to frequently clash with democracy and human rights (del Biondo, 2011Biondo, , 2015aBiondo, , 2015b. 3 For instance, the implementation of a sanction might be perceived as potentially weakening economic and social conditions in the target country.…”

“…The added value is the ability to explain why the EU chooses one norm over another when they point in different directions. This is arguably a much-needed contribution to the literature on the EU's global role, as empirical evidence suggests that the number of cases in which norms collide is increasing (del Biondo, 2011Biondo, , 2015aBiondo, , 2015b.…”

Donor's Double Talk Undermines African Agency - Comparative Study of Civic Agency in Burkina Faso and Togo

“…In addition, aid unpredictability weakens governance by providing incentives to corrupt leaders to engage in rent-seeking (Kangoye 2013). A recent comparative analysis of EU development aid in 17 African countries revealed that strategic allies as well as good growth performers were shielded against necessary sanctions, actually required because of undemocratic governance and human rights violations (Del Biondo 2015). Competing commercial and strategic interests prevent donors from making a more positive contribution (Brown 2004).…”