‘Donors go home’: non-traditional state actors and the creation of development space in Zambia

Toward New Knowledges in Development: New Actors and Alliances

“…Whitfield and Buur (2014) demonstrate how ruling elites and domestic productive capitalist relations seen in Mozambique and Ghana have historical precedents in the sugar plantations and small-holder cocoa farms, and that these continue to present challenges for contemporary development. Alliances between new aid actors (China, India and Brazil) and the Zambian state are formed upon the fraught history of the country's domination by its traditional donors and lenders as shown by Kragelund (2014). And while the scale of contemporary philanthrocapitalism may appear extreme, McGoey (2014) traces this to the nineteenth-century development of international markets, with the state remaining central, though concealed by the relations of 'new' philanthropy.…”

Towards convergence and cooperation in the global development finance regime: closing Africa's policy space?

“…6 It has amongst other things resulted in the drafting of a new national development plan, without the direct involvement of the donors, and the recurrent critique of the DAC donors by key political figures in Zambia, asking them to 'pack their bags and go' if they keep interfering in internal affairs. Moreover, it has led to the de-privatization of key strategic enterprises and the passing of the Bank of Zambia (Amendment) Bill 2013, which will enable the Bank to better monitor and regulate foreign exchange flows as well as imports and exports (Kragelund 2014).…”

What happens to local participation when national ownership gets stronger? Initiating an exploration in Rwanda and Cambodia

“…Despite consensus that countries should “own” their development strategies, donors have become closely involved in the policy process—through technical assistance and stipulated “policy dialogue”—which has subsequently been interpreted as an instance of negotiation. Assumed to have divergent interests, donors are seen as seeking to retain control and recipients as strategically “dealing” with donors (Whitfield, 2009a; Kragelund, 2014; Hasselskog et al, 2017). This, in combination with donors committing to fund only what has been defined as a priority by the recipient country, has contributed to overly exhaustive development plans, resembling wish lists in which most donors will find something that they are willing to fund (Whitfield, 2009a; Brown, 2017).…”