Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods

Segal-Halevi, Erel; Hassidim, Avinatan; Aumann, Yonatan

doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/68

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…By prior-free, it is meant that the mechanism does not make any assumption on the type of valuations the agents reveal. Some double auction mechanism makes assumption on the valuation of the agents such as agent's valuation as decreasing marginal returns (DMR) Blumrosen and Dobzinski (2014); Segal-Halevi et al (2018b), additive valuation Hirai and Sato (2021); Goel et al (2016); Feldman and Gonen (2016), gross substitute Segal-Halevi et al (2018a) or their valuation is represented by single parameter Gonen and Egri (2017); Gonen et al (2007). In Blumrosen and Dobzinski (2014) a mechanism is proposed for multi parametric agents with DMR valuation but is not asymptotically efficient.…”

Section: Double Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

QUAD: A Quality Aware Multi-Unit Double Auction Framework for IoT-Based Mobile Crowdsensing in Strategic Setting

Singh¹,

Jasti²,

Singh³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Crowdsourcing with the intelligent agents carrying smart devices is becoming increasingly popular in recent years. It has opened up meeting an extensive list of real life applications such as measuring air pollution level, road traffic information, and so on. In literature this is known as mobile crowdsourcing or mobile crowdsensing. In this paper, the discussed set-up consists of multiple task requesters (or task providers) and multiple IoT devices (as task executors), where each of the task providers is having multiple homogeneous sensing tasks. Each of the task requesters report bid along with the number of homogeneous sensing tasks to the platform. On the other side, we have multiple IoT devices that reports the ask (charge for imparting its services) and the number of sensing tasks that it can execute. The valuations of task requesters and IoT devices are private information, and both might act strategically. One assumption that is made in this paper is that the bids and asks of the agents (task providers and IoT devices) follow decreasing marginal returns criteria. In this paper, a truthful mechanism is proposed for allocating the IoT devices to the sensing tasks carried by task requesters, that also keeps into account the quality of IoT devices. The mechanism is truthful, budget balance, individual rational, computationally efficient, and prior-free. The simulations are carried out to measure the performance of the proposed mechanism against the benchmark mechanisms. The code and the synthetic data are available at https://github.com/Samhitha-Jasti/QUAD-Implementation.

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Section: Double Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

QUAD: A Quality Aware Multi-Unit Double Auction Framework for IoT-Based Mobile Crowdsensing in Strategic Setting

Singh¹,

Jasti²,

Singh³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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“…Other lines of work provide (1) asymptotic approximation guarantees in the number of items optimally traded for settings as general as multi-unit buyers and sellers and k types of items [28,36,35], (2) dual asymptotic and worstcase guarantees for double auctions and matching markets [1], and (3) Bulow-Klemperer-style guarantees of the number of additional buyers (or sellers) needed in double auctions in order for the GFT of the new setting running a simple mechanism to beat the first-best GFT of the original setting [2].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization

Cai¹,

Goldner²,

Ma³

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)

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We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a setting with n heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller i, and there is a constrained-additive buyer with feasibility constraint F. Multi-dimensional settings in one-sided markets, e.g. where a seller owns multiple heterogeneous items but also is the mechanism designer, are well-understood. In addition, single-dimensional settings in two-sided markets, e.g. where a buyer and seller each seek or own a single item, are also well-understood. Multi-dimensional two-sided markets, however, encapsulate the major challenges of both lines of work: optimizing the sale of heterogeneous items, ensuring incentive-compatibility among both sides of the market, and enforcing budget balance. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first worst-case approximation guarantee for gains from trade in a multi-dimensional two-sided market.Our first result provides an O(log(1/r))-approximation to the first-best gains from trade for a broad class of downward-closed feasibility constraints (such as matroid, matching, knapsack, or the intersection of these). Here r is the minimum probability over all items that a buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. Our second result removes the dependence on r and provides an unconditional O(log n)-approximation to the second-best gains from trade. We extend both results for a general constrained-additive buyer, losing another O(log n)-factor en-route. The first result is achieved using a fixed posted price mechanism, and the analysis involves a novel application of the prophet inequality or a new concentration inequality. Our second result follows from a stitching lemma that allows us to upper bound the second-best gains from trade by the first-best gains * The arxiv version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv. org/abs/2007.13934. † Supported by a Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship and the NSF Award CCF-1942583 (CAREER) . ‡ Supported by NSF Award DMS-1903037 and a Columbia Data Science Institute postdoctoral fellowship.from trade from the "likely to trade" items (items with trade probability at least 1/n) and the optimal profit from selling the "unlikely to trade" items. We can obtain an O(log n)approximation to the first term by invoking our O(log(1/r))approximation on the "likely to trade" items. We introduce a generalization of the fixed posted price mechanism-seller adjusted posted price-to obtain an O(log n)-approximation to the optimal profit for the "unlikely to trade" items. Unlike fixed posted price mechanisms, not all seller adjusted posted price mechanisms are incentive compatible and budget balanced. We develop a new argument based on "allocation coupling" to show the seller adjusted posted price mechanism used in our approximation is indeed budget balanced and incentive-compatible.

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“…The present work handles multiple categories of agents, but each agent is single-parametric. An orthogonal line of work (Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann 2018a;2018b;2 When optimizing gain from trade we optimize the difference between the total value of the sold items for the buyers and the total value of these items for the sellers. When optimizing social welfare in a market we optimize the sum of the buying agents' valuations plus the sum of the unsold items' value held by selling agents at the end of trade.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets

Gonen

Segal-Halevi

2020

AAAI

Self Cite

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In two-sided markets, Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem states that one can not maximize the gain-from-trade while also satisfying truthfulness, individual-rationality and no deficit. Attempts have been made to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's result by attaining approximately-maximum gain-from-trade: the double-sided auctions of McAfee (1992) is truthful and has no deficit, and the one by Segal-Halevi et al. (2016) additionally has no surplus — it is strongly-budget-balanced. They consider two categories of agents — buyers and sellers, where each trade set is composed of a single buyer and a single seller.The practical complexity of applications such as supply chain require one to look beyond two-sided markets. Common requirements are for: buyers trading with multiple sellers of different or identical items, buyers trading with sellers through transporters and mediators, and sellers trading with multiple buyers. We attempt to address these settings.We generalize Segal-Halevi et al. (2016)'s strongly-budget-balanced double-sided auction setting to a multilateral market where each trade set is composed of any number of agent categories. Our generalization refines the notion of competition in multi-sided auctions by introducing the concepts of external competition and trade reduction. We also show an obviously-truthful implementation of our auction using multiple ascending prices.Full version, including omitted proofs and simulation experiments, is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08094.

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Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods

Cited by 10 publications

References 5 publications

QUAD: A Quality Aware Multi-Unit Double Auction Framework for IoT-Based Mobile Crowdsensing in Strategic Setting

QUAD: A Quality Aware Multi-Unit Double Auction Framework for IoT-Based Mobile Crowdsensing in Strategic Setting

On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets

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