Down in the Dumps: Administering America's "Unfair" Trade Laws

Boltuck, Richard D.; Litan, Robert E.

doi:10.2307/20080296

Cited by 41 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Given the findings of other related literature (Boltuck and Litan, 1991) we are more inclined to believe the former hypothesis, which casts further doubt on the fairness of AD law. Table 2.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 87%

Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries

Knetter

Prusa

2000

100

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors. We show that real exchange rate fluctuations affect the two criteria for dumping in opposite ways, making the overall effect on filings ambiguous in theory. Interestingly, no such ambiguity is evidenced in the data. Examining the filing patterns of the four major users of AD law during the 1980-98 period we find that real exchange rates and domestic real GDP growth both have statistically significant impacts on filings. Bilateral filing data indicate that a one-standard deviation real appreciation of the domestic currency increases filings by 33% while a one-standard deviation fall in domestic real GDP increases filings by 23%.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 87%

Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries

Knetter

Prusa

2000

100

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The database includes other US-targeted countries such as Ecuador, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Trinidad and Tobago, but we exclude them since they never imposed a bilateral TTB measure on US goods in 1988US goods in -2013 73 All TTBs require some sort of evidence for injury (or threat of) to the domestic industry. In practice, as argued by Boltuck and Litan (1991) and Lindsey and Ikenson (2003), neither the petitioners nor the authorities almost never establish a rigorous causal relationship between rising imports and injury suffered by the domestic industry.…”

Section: A4 Exogenous Probability Of Obtaining Protection: θmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 See, for example, Boltuck and Litan (1991) who examine the lax application of AD criteria. For in-depth analyses on declining industries and trade protection, see Hillman (1982), Brainard and Verdier (1997), and Magee (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cascading Trade Protection: Evidence from the US

Erbahar

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (2014) which identifies the key factors and their interactions that cause cascading protection to motivate our empirical analysis. Then, we test our model by identifying the input-output relationships among the time-varying temporary trade barriers of the US using its detailed input-output tables. Terms of use: Documents inAs predicted by the theory, we find that measures on imported inputs increase the likelihood of their downstream users' subsequent trade remedy petition over the 1988-2013 period. Moreover, our simulation exercise shows that cascading protection can cause additional welfare losses, and hence we propose that trade policy investigations should take vertical linkages into account.JEL codes: F1, F13, F14, F68

show abstract

“…There is considerable scope for discretion by the two agencies that administer the AD law, e.g., as discussed in various chapters by Boltuck and Litan (1991), Lindsey and Ikenson (2002), and Blonigen (2006) regarding the USDOC; Cass and Knoll (1997) and Sykes (1997) regarding the USITC. But in general terms this is not surprising.…”

Section: Possible Sources Of Bias In Us Ad Law Against Dcsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first method is price discrimination (PD), where NV is based on ex factory prices charged by the foreign firm on sales of the same or comparable product to its home country customers. According to U.S. law this is the 9 Although zeroing was the established practice at USDOC/Treasury for some time, possibly several decades, and identified by economists as distorting published AD margins some twenty years ago (Boltuck (1987), see also Boltuck and Litan (1991)) it is somewhat surprising that it took so long for foreign countries to overturn the practice at the GATT or WTO. However, in his review of the history of the zeroing issue at the GATT/WTO, Kim (2002) recounts that it had been objected to as early as 1989 by the Nordic countries in a submission made during the Uruguay Round.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Unfair Import Laws Unfair to Developing Countries: Evidence from U.S. Antidumping Actions 1990-2004

Morkre¹,

Spinanger²,

Tran

2008

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper investigates the effects of U.S. AD actions on DCs. It first considers administrative actions by the U.S. Department of Commerce, which decides AD margins for countries. It then considers decision making by the U.S. International Trade Commission, which determines injury to domestic industry. The econometric results show that USDOC actions lead to significantly higher AD margins for NMEs (all DCs) than for MOEs. Among countries that suffer from U.S. AD actions DCs have a significantly higher ratio of dumped imports to total imports (relative dumped imports) compared with middle income countries. However, the results also show that relative dumped imports of high income countries are also greater than middle income countries. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

show abstract

Down in the Dumps: Administering America's "Unfair" Trade Laws

Cited by 41 publications

References 0 publications

Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries

Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries

Cascading Trade Protection: Evidence from the US

Are Unfair Import Laws Unfair to Developing Countries: Evidence from U.S. Antidumping Actions 1990-2004

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About