Drafting the law. Civil servants at work at the French Ministry of Ecology

Bonnaud, Laure; Martinais, Emmanuel

doi:10.1016/j.soctra.2014.07.005

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In their article, Marsh and Smith () do not problematise the ‘unity’ of the state as an actor. Following the ideas of Bonnaud and Martinais (), we question the role of the state both in terms of administrative structures and the expertise of civil servants and in terms of the political willingness of politicians (ministers, government) to support policy development. This approach allows us to identify discrepancies between political willingness and the administrative structures and expertise as obstacles to policy network activities.…”

Section: Conceptual Framework and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of Organic Agriculture in Bulgaria (1990–2012): Actors, Relations, and Networks

2016

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This article analyses the development of organic agriculture (OA) in Bulgaria. It especially examines the actors, relations, and structures that shape organic sector policies. The Bulgarian case shows that sectorial agricultural policies can originate without the direct representation of farmers. Due to the dominance of consultancy NGOs and academic institutions in the policy network, OA first appeared as a political rather than as an economic or social and agricultural topic. However, this specificity contributed to the weak development of the organic sector in the country. Ultimately, farmers became engaged in the policy network for the benefit of the sector when the EU implemented organic subsidies. The article is based on both qualitative and quantitative data and applies the policy network approach as the analytical framework. Our analysis contributes to enriching this approach by exploring the role of the state in terms of both political willingness and administrative capacity and shows that in a post‐socialist context, the policy outcome also depends on the synchronisation of these two roles of the state.

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Section: Conceptual Framework and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of Organic Agriculture in Bulgaria (1990–2012): Actors, Relations, and Networks

2016

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“…In parliamentary democracies, the bulk of legislation is designed and drafted in ministries. The reasons for this are variegated: the civil servants working within the top executive are generally experts in their policy area and, hence, are able to draft policy that is both effective and fits the existing legal framework (Bonnaud & Martinais, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2019; Page, 2003). Furthermore, executive agencies serve as a bridgehead to relevant societal actors, which enables ministries to draw on additional topical expertize (Epstein et al., 2014; Yackee, 2006; Yackee & Yackee, 2006).…”

Section: Arenas Of Mutual Control Between Coalition Partners and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Importantly, all those executive mechanisms focus on the top level of ministers but neglect the organizational side of the ministerial bureaucracy. This is striking, as the vast resources and expertize of the ministerial bureaucracy are vital for government policy‐making (Bonnaud & Martinais, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2019; Page, 2003)—and engendered the theory of ministerial government (Laver & Shepsle, 1996), which raised the theoretical problem of agency loss in the first place (Andeweg, 2000). Traditionally, the model of ministerial government assumes that policy responsibilities are clearly cut up between and assigned to individual ministries.…”

Section: Arenas Of Mutual Control Between Coalition Partners and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Colleagues or adversaries: Ministerial coordination across party lines

2023

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In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross‐party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top‐level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate.

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“…Firstly, in many governments there is a tacit agreement among ministers not to interfere in their colleagues' affairs, be it for reasons of high ministerial workload or anticipated reciprocity (Andeweg, 2000). Secondly, the task of drafting legislation is performed by highly specialized bureaucrats within the ministries, who are able to embed new policy ideas within the already existing legal framework (Bonnaud & Martinais, 2014, p. 2003). Hence, as long as the government neither purposefully condones nor accidentally permits redundancies of this specialized policy staff, ministries lack the expertise to design bills outside their policy domain (see case studies in Laver & Shepsle, 1994).…”

Section: Portfolios and Policy Domainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ministerial policy dominance in parliamentary democracies

Klüser

Breunig

2022

European J Political Res

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To what extent do ministries dominate a particular policy domain? The policy dictator model and many principle-agent models of governmental control that followed suit assume that governments create ministries with clear and exclusive policy responsibilities. We test this assertion using data from parliamentary bills from Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. For each bill, we observe its substantial policy content and the responsible ministry. The data show that bills on similar issues regularly are drafted by different ministries in parliamentary democracies. About 40 per cent of policy issues cannot be ascribed to one dominant ministry. The regularities elucidate that ministerial division of labour within governments is considerably more complex than commonly assumed. The variegated level of ministerial dominance across policy domains calls for a new research agenda on how governments assign responsibility for legislative action in parliamentary democracies.

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Drafting the law. Civil servants at work at the French Ministry of Ecology

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

Development of Organic Agriculture in Bulgaria (1990–2012): Actors, Relations, and Networks

Development of Organic Agriculture in Bulgaria (1990–2012): Actors, Relations, and Networks

Colleagues or adversaries: Ministerial coordination across party lines

Ministerial policy dominance in parliamentary democracies

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