Driving deaths and injuries post-9/11

Abstract

ObjectivesIn the days immediately following the terror attacks of 9/11, thousands of Americans chose to drive rather than to fly. We analyzed highway accident data to determine whether or not the number of fatalities and injuries following 9/11 differed from those in the same time period in 2000 and 2002.MethodsMotor crash data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System were analyzed to determine the numbers and rates of fatalities and injuries nationally and in selected states for the 20 days after September 11, in each of 2000, 2001, and 2002.ResultsWhile the fatality rate did not change appreciably, the number of less severe injuries was statistically higher in 2001 than in 2000, both nationally and in New York State.ConclusionsThe fear of terror attacks may have compelled Americans to drive instead of fly. They were thus exposed to the heightened risk of injury and death posed by driving. The need for public health to manage risk perception and communication is thus heightened in an era of global fear and terrorism.

The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse

“…This may be the case for unusual but experienced events that are ‘available’ in the public mind and induce strong feelings such as dread; in response to experienced calamities, people are often highly motivated to take action, even if that action is ineffective or excessively costly (Wuthnow, ). For example, public reactions to the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks included shifting from flying to driving with potentially greater injury risk (Deonandan and Backwell, ; Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, ), and supporting two wars that were costly in money and lives (Stern and Wiener, ; Wuthnow, ). But with regard to ultra‐low‐frequency catastrophic risks, events that perhaps only occur once in eons, and hence are not experienced, it is not the case that the public is calling for overreaction while experts urge calm (Weber, ).…”