Drugs Around the Corner: Domestic Drug Markets and Violence in Colombia and Mexico

Abstract

Over the past decade, drug consumption has increased in Colombia and Mexico, countries traditionally concerned with drug production and trafficking. Governments and observers have associated this growth with spikes in violence. Drawing on drug consumption surveys and fieldwork in four cities, this study argues that contrary to this perception, there is no automatic connection between domestic drug markets and violence. Violence depends on whether large drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) control low-level street dealers and on whether those DTOs have a market monopoly at the local level. When dealers are independent, violence might be sporadic, but when DTOs control dealers, violence can explode (given competition between DTOs) or implode (if one organization holds a monopoly). Control over dealers provides DTOs not only income but also informants and armed muscle. This article also shows that domestic drug markets are not new, and have grown incrementally in the past two decades.

Profits and Violence in Illegal Markets: Evidence from Venezuela

“…If money in illegal markets in Venezuela fueled violent conflict, why? This finding is in keeping with some theoretical results but at variance with others; empirically, while some studies document a positive relationship between trafficking booms and violence (e.g., Angrist and Kugler 2008; de la Sierra 2014; Castillo et al Forthcoming), others point to the peaceful growth of international and domestic trafficking markets (e.g., Duran-Martinez 2015a; Lessing 2018).…”

“…Some theories predict that booms in illegal markets facilitate peace, while others predict that booms fuel violence. There is qualitative evidence on both sides (e.g., Duran-Martinez 2015a, 123; 2015b, 1393–96). As Lessing (2018) summarized, on the one hand, “the larger the pie, the more there is to fight over;” on the other, “lower profits make for more vicious competition and less pacting among [drug] cartels” (p. 23).…”

Negotiating Violence and Protection in Prison and on the Outside: The Organizational Evolution of the Transnational Prison Gang Barrio Azteca

“…Nonetheless, the Mexicles, like Barrio Azteca, became a principal competitor in the protection market in Ciudad Juárez, where many of its members were deported upon completion of their prison sentences. The proxy war that unfolded between Barrio Azteca and the Mexicles and their allies, a gang called the Artistas Asesinos, on behalf of the Juárez and Sinaloa Cartels, respectively, was the largest driver of the city’s exorbitant body count from 2003 to 2014 (Bowden, 2010; Durán Martínez, 2015; Heinle, Molzahn, & Shirk, 2015).…”

“…This ambition was mirrored in the street in the quest to earn money through illicit enterprise: In the context of Mexico, the protection which the Aztecas offered interested the city’s dominant drug trafficking organization, the Juárez Cartel, also known as La Línea or the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (Jones, 2016), which had long been moving wholesale quantities of drugs across the border at the Paso del Norte (H. Campbell, 2009; Durán Martínez, 2015; Heiskanen, 2016; Patenostro, 1995).…”

“…The relationship between Barrio Azteca and La Línea dates back to at least 2008 (Burton & West, 2008), as cartels contested control of Ciudad Juárez, which was then, and still is now, an important plaza for drug traffickers (International Crisis Group, 2008). Barrio Azteca members came to fulfill two distinct roles—that of retail drug dealer/wholesale trafficker and that of enforcer (Durán Martínez, 2015). Charlie, the gang squad detective, described this development:[A]bout 2008 [was when] we started seeing this war between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Juárez Cartel start to erupt.…”