Dummy Traffic against Long Term Intersection Attacks

Berthold, Oliver; Langos, Heinrich

doi:10.1007/3-540-36467-6_9

Cited by 69 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Dummy traffic has been discussed with regard to several attack schemes [13,14,15]. In general, it has been found to be a rather weak countermeasure in packet-switched networks.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Data Retention and Anonymity Services

Berthold

Böhme

Köpsell

2009

The Future of Identity in the Information Society

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Abstract.The recently introduced legislation on data retention to aid prosecuting cyber-related crime in Europe also affects the achievable security of systems for anonymous communication on the Internet. We argue that data retention requires a review of existing security evaluations against a new class of realistic adversary models. In particular, we present theoretical results and first empirical evidence for intersection attacks by law enforcement authorities. The reference architecture for our study is the anonymity service AN.ON, from which we also collect empirical data. Our adversary model reflects an interpretation of the current implementation of the EC Directive on Data Retention in Germany.

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“…Dummy traffic has been discussed with regard to several attack schemes [13,14,15]. In general, it has been found to be a rather weak countermeasure in packet-switched networks.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Let p be the probability that both events are caused by the same user. 13 Further, as illustrated in Fig. 4, let A be the set of suspect senders (i.e., the result of a cross-section attack) at the time of E 1 and B the set of suspects for E 2 .…”

Section: Probabilistic Intersection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Data Retention and Anonymity Services

Berthold

Böhme

Köpsell

2009

The Future of Identity in the Information Society

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“…Since the intersection of two different anonymity sets is likely to be smaller than either of the anonymity sets (due to the assumed regularity in behavior), different intersections of anonymity sets could be used to gain information about the targeted user (see for such an analysis e.g. [18,19]). …”

Section: Related Work: Vulnerabilities Of the Mixesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments

Kedogan

Agrawal²,

Penz

2002

Information Hiding

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Abstract.A user is only anonymous within a set of other users. Hence, the core functionality of an anonymity providing technique is to establish an anonymity set. In open environments, such as the Internet, the established anonymity sets in the whole are observable and change with every anonymous communication. We use this fact of changing anonymity sets and present a model where we can determine the protection limit of an anonymity technique, i.e. the number of observations required for an attacker to "break" uniquely a given anonymity technique. In this paper, we use the popular MIX method to demonstrate our attack. The MIX method forms the basis of most of the today's deployments of anonymity services (e.g. Freedom, Onion Routing, Webmix). We note that our approach is general and can be applied equally well to other anonymity providing techniques.

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“…We believe that such an adversary is impractical for large and dynamic P2P systems, though many of these attacks can be thwarted by means of cover traffic [52]. 16 This assumes that the initiator and responder are within the portion of the network observed by the adversary.…”

Section: Mutual Anonymity In Muonmentioning

confidence: 99%

MuON: Epidemic based mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks

et al. 2008

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A mutual anonymity system enables communication between a client and a service provider without revealing their identities. In general, the anonymity guarantees made by the protocol are enhanced when a large number of participants are recruited into the anonymity system. Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are able to attract a large number of nodes and hence are highly suitable for anonymity systems. However, the churn (changes in system membership) within P2P networks, poses a significant challenge for low-bandwidth reliable anonymous communication in these networks. This paper presents MuON, a protocol to achieve mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks. MuON leverages epidemic-style data dissemination to deal with churn. Simulation results and security analysis indicate that MuON provides mutual anonymity in networks with high churn, while maintaining predictable latencies, high reliability, and low communication overhead.

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Dummy Traffic against Long Term Intersection Attacks

Cited by 69 publications

References 6 publications

Data Retention and Anonymity Services

Data Retention and Anonymity Services

Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments

MuON: Epidemic based mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks

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