Duties to Make Friends

Abstract

Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet widely recognised. Specifically, in certain situations, impartial principles generate duties to take actions and adopt attitudes in our personal lives that increase the chance of new or different special relationships being formed-new or different friendships, family-like relationships, relationships akin to co-nationality, and so on. In fact, even if one thinks partialism is the best justification of the duties we have once in special relationships, impartialist justifications for taking steps to form such relationships should have some sway. Moreover, a little reflection shows that these duties are not as demanding or counterintuitive as one might expect.

Aristotelian Character Friendship as a ‘Method’ of Moral Education

“…Taken to the other extreme, a strict utilitarian demand to maximise overall utility at every turn would put a positive non-supererogatory obligation on teachers to play 'friendship matchmakers', in order to enhance the flourishing of the greatest number of children in their care (cf. Collins 2013). While one may grumble that the strict utilitarian demand is counter-productive in the long run from the utilitarian perspective itself because of its extreme burn-out-threatening demandingness, in this case the excess of playing friendship matchmaker seems closer to the golden mean of appropriate teacher intervention than the deficiency of ignoring or discouraging the role of student friendships.…”

‘I am your son, mother’: severe dementia and duties to visit parents who can’t recognise you

“…Whereas a lot more is to be said in defence of generic duties of sociability, I will not do so here as Collins (2013) and Brownlee (2013) have already offered elaborate and compelling defences. What is pertinent for us is that, inasmuch as we have generic duties of sociability, one may reasonably expect that the best way for many people to discharge these duties will involve providing company to any parents with severe dementia that they might have.…”

The Ethics of Love

“…This debate has considered, among other topics, whether it is morally wrong to have sexual or romantic preferences for people particular ethnic backgrounds (Zheng 2016) and whether it is unjust that some groups of people are desired less than others (O'Shea 2020; Srinivasan 2021). Philosophers have also begun to investigate whether we have a human right to be loved (Liao 2015) or to be free from social deprivation (Brownlee 2020) and whether we have duties to make friends with others (Collins 2013). Similarly, the recent literature has also involved discussions of a number of ethical issues that arise from romantic and sexual relationships such as consent (Dougherty 2013), infidelity (McKeever 2020), the use of love drugs (Earp and Savulescu 2020;Spreeuwenberg and Schaubroeck 2020), and ethical issues that arise at the end of relationships (Lopez-Cantero and Archer 2020).…”