Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior

Scholz, John T.; Pinney, Neil

doi:10.2307/2111622

Cited by 246 publications

(151 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Specifically, our study corroborates survey evidence suggesting that taxpayers have imperfect knowledge of deterrence parameters, with less informed individuals tending to overestimate the actual risk of being audited (Scholz andPinney 1995, Chetty 2009). Further, our study carries important implications for the design of optimal enforcement policies.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 82%

Taking the high road? Compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers

Paetzold

Winner

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe provide first field evidence on evasion spillovers as an important determinant of the individual compliance decision. Exploiting discontinuities in a self-reported commuter tax allowance, we observe a substantial share of taxpayers misreporting their claims. Using exogenous variation in job changes we find that individual evasion decisions are influenced by the compliance behavior of other co-workers, with job changers from low-to high-cheating companies starting to evade much more after they move. In contrast, movers from high-to low-cheating companies do not alter their reporting. The most likely explanation is information transmission, including increased knowledge about the possibilities for non-compliance.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 82%

Taking the high road? Compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers

Paetzold

Winner

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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“…Experimental evidence from Social and Political Psychology has established that the level of trust and the degree of trustworthiness decreases with ethnic diversity (Zucker, 1986;Tyler, 1998;Glaeser et al, 2000;Alesina and Ferrara, 2002). Further experimental evidence has established that tax compliance increases with trust (Scholz and Pinney, 1995;scholz and Lubell, 1998a, b;Scholz, 1998). The argument given is that people are willing to comply if they know that everyone else complies.…”

Section: Ethnicity Governance and Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnicity, Governance and the Provision of Public Goods

Kimenyi

2006

Journal of African Economies

119

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Ethnicity is an important institution and one that impacts on the quality of governance. This paper focuses on the behavior of ethnic groups and specifically on their impact on the provision of public goods. The paper shows that ethnic heterogeneity results in under-provision of non-excludable public goods. On the other hand, such societies associate with provision of patronage goods. The paper proposes some areas of research such the economics of ethnic institutions, empirical evidence of the role ethnic groups on public goods provision, tax compliance and institutional reforms to improve governance.

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“…For example, tax literature has shown that the majority of people pay their taxes while actually the chances of getting caught when you do not pay taxes, are low (Torgler and Schneider 2005). This illustrates that people pay taxes based on internalized norms such as ''tax morale'' (Torgler and Schneider 2005) or a feeling of duty (Scholz and Pinney 1995). In criminology it has been advocated that the interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives should be taken into account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When sanctions convey moral norms

Mulder

2016

Eur J Law Econ

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Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but they also have the ability to convey moral norms. As such, they may create a moral motivation not to engage in the sanctioned behavior. This is desirable as this makes the success of a sanctioning system depend less on quality of enforcement. However, sanctions may not always succeed in conveying moral norms. In this paper, three conditions are highlighted that, in the psychology literature, have been empirically proven to influence whether a sanction succeeds to evoke moral norms. First, a sanction should not be regarded as a way to make up for the negative consequences of a transgression a sanction. So, they should be communicated in a retributive way rather than in a compensatory way. Second, as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule, punishments are a better way to incur moral norms than rewards. Third, severe sanctions more strongly convey a moral norm than mild ones as long as these severe sanctions are not unreasonably severe, are installed by trustworthy authorities and in a fair way. The value of the moral expressive function of sanctions, as well as its drawbacks, are discussed.

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Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior

Cited by 246 publications

References 29 publications

Taking the high road? Compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers

Taking the high road? Compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers

Ethnicity, Governance and the Provision of Public Goods

When sanctions convey moral norms

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