Dynamic Connectivity Game for Adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things Systems

Abuzainab, Nof; Saad, Walid

doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2786546

Cited by 39 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The work in [3] integrates IoT and network centric warfare for the enhancement of the IoBT integrity. The authors in [4] use a feedback Stackelberg solution to dynamically optimize the connectivity of an adversarial IoBT network. The work in [5] develops a mean-field game approach to analyze the spread of misinformation in an adversarial IoBT.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The work in [5] develops a mean-field game approach to analyze the spread of misinformation in an adversarial IoBT. Despite the promising results, these existing works [2]- [4] mostly rely on static constructs and do not consider the influence of the human players' psychology and potential bounded rationality when making decisions or choosing strategies within an IoBT setting. Indeed, the behavioral aspect of human decision making processes, leading agents to deviate from the fully rational objective behavior in an IoBT, has a direct impact on the security of the IoBT network.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an IoBT, the connectivity between the wearables carried by the soldiers and other IoBT devices, such as multipurpose sensors, autonomous vehicles, and drones, plays a significant role in the mission-critical battlefield operations [3]. However, the connectivity between these devices is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks, given the the adversarial nature of the battlefield coupled with the limitations of the IoBT devices' security mechanisms [4]. Moreover, in an adversarial battlefield environment, the psychology of the soldiers and attackers could significantly influence their behavior, and, subsequently influence the security of the IoBT network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Sanjab

Saad

2019

IEEE Internet Things J.

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In this paper, a novel anti-jamming mechanism is proposed to analyze and enhance the security of adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) systems. In particular, the problem is formulated as a dynamic psychological game between a soldier and an attacker. In this game, the soldier seeks to accomplish a time-critical mission by traversing a battlefield within a certain amount of time, while maintaining its connectivity with an IoBT network. The attacker, on the other hand, seeks to find the optimal opportunity to compromise the IoBT network and maximize the delay of the soldier's IoBT transmission link. The soldier and the attacker's psychological behavior are captured using tools from psychological game theory, with which the soldier's and attacker's intentions to harm one another are considered in their utilities. To solve this game, a novel learning algorithm based on Bayesian updating is proposed to find a ǫ-like psychological self-confirming equilibrium of the game. Simulation results show that, based on the error-free beliefs on the attacker's psychological strategies and beliefs, the soldier's material payoff can be improved by up to 15.11% compared to a conventional dynamic game without psychological considerations.

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Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Sanjab

Saad

2019

IEEE Internet Things J.

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“…While there have been a growing body of works that address the problem of minimizing the age of information in various scenarios [5]- [10], [13], [15], [16], few works have studied this problem in an adversarial setting [17]. Since timely status updates are of particular importance to real-time monitoring and control systems, the attackers of these systems may specifically target their capability of timely updating the status [21], [22]. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how would an attacker sabotage a real-time monitoring/control system, how should the system defend against the attack, and to what extent the attacker can degrade the timeliness of status update.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A dynamic jamming game for real-time status updates

Xiao

Sun

2018

IEEE INFOCOM 2018 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)

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We study timely status updates of a real-time system in an adversarial setting. The system samples a physical process, and sends the samples from the source (e.g., a sensor) to the destination (e.g, a control center) through a channel. For realtime monitoring/control tasks, it is crucial for the system to update the status of the physical process "timely". We measure the timeliness of status updates by the time elapsed since the latest update at the destination was generated at the source, and define the time elapsed as age of information, or age in short. To sabotage the system, an attacker aims to maximize the age by jamming the channel and hence causing delay in status updates. The system aims to minimize the age by judiciously choosing when to sample and send the updates. We model the ongoing repeated interaction between the attacker and the system as a dynamic game. In each stage game, the attacker chooses the jamming time according to the jamming time distribution, and the system responds by delaying the sampling according to the sampling policy. We prove that there exists a unique stationary equilibrium in the game, and provide a complete analytical characterization of the equilibrium. Our results shed lights on how the attacker sabotages the system and how the system should defend against the attacker.

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“…Thus, there is a need to implement cost-efficient actions that can effectively limit the spread of misinformation. Here, it is also worth noting that, recently, a number of works [18]- [21] have studied various IoBT security scenarios, however, these works do not analyze the critical problem of misinformation spread.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Multiclass Mean-Field Game for Thwarting Misinformation Spread in the Internet of Battlefield Things

Abuzainab

Saad

2018

IEEE Trans. Commun.

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In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting a given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed to find the mean-field equilibrium. Then, the finite IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the quality of information (QoI) compared to a baseline scheme in which the IoBT nodes are always transmitting. The results also show that the proposed scheme can reduce the proportion of infected nodes by 99% compared to the baseline.

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Dynamic Connectivity Game for Adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things Systems

Cited by 39 publications

References 20 publications

Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

A dynamic jamming game for real-time status updates

A Multiclass Mean-Field Game for Thwarting Misinformation Spread in the Internet of Battlefield Things

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