Dynamic exploits: calculative asymmetries in the on‐demand economy

Abstract

On‐demand service firms secure market power by cultivating and operationalising calculative asymmetries between the platform and labour. In this article, I analyse dynamic (or ‘surge’) pricing as an exemplary calculative technique. I show how the asymmetrical application of price‐setting allows firms to leverage control at the aggregate level while maintaining the façade of autonomy at the individual level, thereby legitimising workers’ classification as independent contractors but solving the coordination problems that the classification introduces. The article complements and extends previous critical research into the platform or ‘on‐demand’ service economy by analysing how management scientists model and simulate on‐demand marketplaces. I consider management science to be a calculative technique for optimising operational efficiency. A critical review of management science provides novel insights into platforms’ efforts to monopolise calculative agency at the expense of other market participants. The article concludes by considering implications for broader critiques of platform labour management.

Microtargeting control: Explicating algorithmic control and nudges in platform‐mediated cab driving in India

“…Fourth, we augment the literature on the non‐neutrality of platforms in two ways: First, we substantiate the discussion on information and calculative asymmetry—the asymmetry in the calculative power to capitalise on the available information (see Shapiro, 2020). Platforms not only have greater information about the market, but as we have shown, they also have massive information about workers.…”

“…Drivers exhibit agency in discovering ‘loopholes’ and taking advantage of them, while the management, for instance with their ‘fraud prevention teams’, attempt to catch up and pre‐empt them for the future. Studies show that drivers figure out ‘algorithmic deceptions’ associated with surge‐pricing manipulations and respond by not ‘chasing the surges’ (Rosenblat, 2018; Shapiro, 2020). In the case of nudges, it is not clear whether their effects last or wear out over time.…”

“…These notifications attempt to direct drivers to certain locations by suggesting higher fares or quicker rides from new locations. Surge pricing denotes premium fares at certain locations because of a higher demand for rides (see Shapiro, 2020). It is problematic to classify such notifications as nudges as they build expectations of better economic incentives since they imply higher fares and earnings.…”

“…Recent studies have highlighted how these platforms exercise control over workers through sophisticated algorithms and nudges (Gandini, 2018; Rosenblat and Stark, 2016; Rosenblat, 2018; Wood, 2019). Studies have also drawn attention to the technology‐enabled information and calculative asymmetries (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016; Shapiro, 2020) which underlie this control.…”

El papel del consumo en la economía de plataformas: el vínculo oculto

“…En primer lugar, es imprescindible destacar que las empresas que operan en esta economía forman en su gran mayoría, irónicamente, monopolios de facto o a lo sumo oligopolios, presentándose en muchos casos no como empresas reales sino como meros intermediarios entre los consumidores y los oferentes de productos y servicios. Estos suelen estar basados en servicios a demanda donde las plataformas cuentan con la capacidad de explotar "asimetrías calculadoras" que sitúan a la plataforma en una posición de poder frente al resto de los participantes en la transacción (Shapiro, 2020). Tanto esa labor de intermediación como la gestión del catálogo de lo ofrecido se va a realizar mediante el uso de algoritmos, programaciones matemáticas que ponderan perfiles de consumidor y patrones de consumo a partir de la extraordinaria agregación de datos generados por la huella digital de los consumidores y que, más que probablemente, estén cambiando los hábitos de consumo para siempre.…”