Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence

Abstract

We use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government's longevity and its performance. Ministers perform well when their careers are valuable; this is so when the government's duration is expected to be long; the government's survival depends on its popularity; and, finally, that popularity depends on its ministers’ performance. The feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational-expectations equilibria can arise: Ministers work hard for a popular government, but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed; these alternatives are both self-fulfilling prophecies. However, the presence of (perhaps small) random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium. We explore the dynamics that arise: A crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government's performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold.

Presidentas Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets?

“…This study therefore uses cabinet appointment theories to derive two determinants of the quantity of female ministeriables: timing within a presidential administration and gender stereotypes associated with ministries. Considering timing, Dewan andMyatt (2010, 2012) have formalized the argument that the pool of all ministerial candidates is largest at the beginning of executive terms. Executives routinely replace ministers who unexpectedly underperform, become implicated in a scandal, or retire for exogenous reasons.…”

“…They contend that the supply of high-quality ministers eventually can be depleted, thereby diminishing cabinet performance. Dewan andMyatt's influential models (2010, 2012) generate the expectation that presidents are best equipped to pursue their preferences at the beginning of their administrations, when the talent pool is deepest and executives can select their most desired candidates.…”

“…Executives seek "competent" appointees to execute their legislative agendas. Competency-the perceived capacity to achieve presidents' goals-is associated with notions of political capital, technical expertise, and partisan ties (Dewan and Myatt 2010;Huber and Martínez 2008;Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Following this concept, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2014) demonstrate that Latin American presidents recruit ministers with "political capital resources" (PCRs), which they operationalize as political skills, ties to organizations related to the cabinet ministry, and status as an expert on the ministry's portfolio.…”

“…A comparatively higher proportion of women in presidentas' networks could lead to a greater likelihood that a presidenta will name a female instead of a male minister. Scholars of cabinet selection tend to agree that executives look for "loyal" and "like-minded" ministers to faithfully pursue the administration's policy agenda (Huber and Martínez 2008;Dewan and Myatt 2010;Indridason and Kam 2008;Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Regarding loyalty, presidents seek evidence-direct and indirect-that the ministerial candidate will not betray them.…”

Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia

“…In the latter case, career concerns pose a trade‐off between selection and efficiency which seems particularly relevant in politics. In a similar vein, Dewan and Myatt (, ) study the incentives faced by ministers in a government where they can only be fired or promoted and the implications of this reward scheme for the performance and longevity of the government. They also find a trade‐off between performance and selection, and study how feedback effects between performance and longevity may lead to multiple equilibria and rich dynamics, such as honeymoon effects, turning points and sudden crises of confidence.…”