Dynamic Non-Classicality

Mandelkern, Matthew

doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1624376

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Although we don't know of explicit claims to this effect, we suspect that e-type theorists have largely taken for granted that their theories of (in)definites and quantifiers can be coupled with classical connectives, given the lack of discussion in this literature of how to treat 'and' and 'or' in this framework. Critical responses to dynamic semantics have often focused on the fact that dynamic semantics requires apparently arbitrarily non-classical connectives (see Heim 1990b;Soames 1989;Schlenker 2008;Mandelkern 2019). The present discussion, however, suggests that e-type theories are not better off in this respect than dynamic ones, since connectives along the lines of (42) and (43) are decidedly non-classical.…”

Section: Prospects For An E-type Theorymentioning

confidence: 69%

Definiteness projection

Mandelkern¹,

Rothschild

2019

Nat Lang Semantics

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We argue that definite noun phrases give rise to uniqueness inferences characterized by a pattern we call definiteness projection. Definiteness projection says that the uniqueness inference of a definite projects out unless there is an indefinite antecedent in a position that filters presuppositions. We argue that definiteness projection poses a serious puzzle for e-type theories of (in)definites; on such theories, indefinites should filter existence presuppositions but not uniqueness presuppositions. We argue that definiteness projection also poses challenges for dynamic approaches, which have trouble generating uniqueness inferences and predicting some filtering behavior, though unlike the challenge for e-type theories, these challenges have mostly been noted in the literature, albeit in a piecemeal way. Our central aim, however, is not to argue for or against a particular view, but rather to formulate and motivate a generalization about definiteness which any adequate theory must account for.Matthew Mandelkern and Daniel Rothschild have contributed equally.

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Section: Prospects For An E-type Theorymentioning

confidence: 69%

Definiteness projection

Mandelkern¹,

Rothschild

2019

Nat Lang Semantics

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“…Might(p ∧ ¬p), the formula will be distributive. As Mandelkern (2020) observes, however, not every formula of the form φ ∧ ¬φ is a contradiction within the test semantics. 17 I will occasionally say of some propositional content that that content is true (or false).…”

Section: Test Semanticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic ‘might’ and correct belief

Skeels

2023

Inquiry

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Synopsis: Veltman's test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. 1 According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that the content of a belief is correct just in case the content of that belief is true. The proponent of the test semantics cannot appeal to this explanation since they hold that certain contents, namely epistemically modalized contents, do not express propositions, and are neither true nor false. Willer (2013) concerns how the test semantics can be marshalled to solve inter alia puzzles of modal disagreement. Crucial to Willer's account is the proposal of a correctness condition which I call evidential correctness. According to evidential correctness, the content of a belief is correct just in case someone with the believing agent's evidence would not be committed to factual error. The present paper argues that evidential correctness does not yield the proper correctness judgments for interlocutors in several common instances of modal disagreement. It further argues that evidential correctness concerns a different kind of correctness than the kind operative in modal disagreements. Since correctness judgments are what motivate the claim that modal disagreements are genuine disagreements, I take these objections to be significant. I subsequently consider two potential alternatives: weak correctness and strong correctness but conclude that each suffers from substantial problems. I then provide my own novel correctness conditions for belief contents within a dynamic framework. I argue that there are, in fact, two conditions for correctness of content that ought to be considered when operating within the test semantics. The first, locative correctness, applies only to contents which locate the believing agent in some subset of the space of possibility by entailing some contingent proposition. The second, informational correctness applies to contents that do not not locate the believing agent. Such content includes, most notably, epistemically modalized content. After motivating this distinction, I * Forthcoming in Inquiry: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.1 The test semantics is introduced in Veltman (1996). See Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991a), Stokhof (1991b), andvan der Does et al. (1997) among many, many others for further developments.1 demonstrate how it yields the requisite correctness judgments on the part of disagreeing agents, and avoids the problems of the previously considered views.14 Must φ = def ¬Might ¬φ. On such an interpretation, Must is strong. While there are reasons to reject the strength of English "must" (see Karttunen (1972)), many working in the test semantics take "must"...

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“…99See, for example, Hacking, 1967; Teller, 1972. For more contemporary work on contextualist semantics for epistemic vocabulary see Dowell, 2011, von Fintel and Gillies, 2007, Moss, 2015, and Mandelkern, 2019.…”

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confidence: 99%

This paper might change your mind

Dever

Schiller

2020

Nous

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Linguistic intervention in rational decision-making is captured in terms of information change. Cases that look like changes in value functions are actually changes in information. This gives us no way to model interventions involving expressions that only have an attentional effect on conversational contexts. How do expressions with non-informational content-like epistemic modals-intervene in rational decision making? We show how to model rational decision change without information change: replace a standard conception of value (on which the value of a set of worlds reduces to values of individual worlds in the set) with one on which the value of a set of worlds is determined by a selection function that picks out a generic member world. We discuss some upshots of this view for theorizing in philosophy and formal semantics. * This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the article; it has not been formatted or copy-edited.

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Dynamic Non-Classicality

Abstract: I show that standard dynamic approaches to the semantics of epistemic modals invalidate the classical laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction, as well as the law of epistemic non-contradiction. I argue that these facts pose a serious challenge.

Cited by 6 publications

References 18 publications

Definiteness projection

Definiteness projection

Dynamic ‘might’ and correct belief

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