Dynamic pricing and coupon promotion strategies in a dual-channel supply chain based on differential game

Li, Zonghuo; Yang, Wensheng; Si, Yinyuan

doi:10.1108/k-02-2021-0160

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 54 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In this section, we extend the models with platform coupons by incorporating customer types. We assume that only a proportion

λ \in ((), 0, 1)

of customers buy the products with platform coupons and their unit payment is

p - f

, while the remaining customers still buy the products at the original price

p

(Li et al, 2020; Li et al, 2021). In this context, the expected customer demand is

q = italicλn ((), 1 - \frac{p - f}{b}) + ((), 1 - λ) n ((), 1 - \frac{p}{b})

.…”

Section: Extension and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ren et al (2021) built a two‐stage hybrid model to forecast the consumers' preference for coupons. Li et al (2021) investigated the impacts of different coupon promotion strategies on the operation of the dual‐channel supply chain. Lv (2021) compared three scenarios with no coupons, coupons issued by one firm, and coupons issued by two firms to explain under what conditions the firms find it profitable to allocate the coupons.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Impacts of platform coupons and power structure on an e‐commerce supply chain

Wan

2023

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper considers an e‐commerce supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online platform and investigates the manufacturer's pricing decisions without and with platform coupons and the online platform's coupon decision under different power structures. In the manufacturer (platform) Stackelberg power structure, issuing platform coupons cannot (can) always stimulate the demand and benefit the manufacturer, the online platform, and the entire system. In the vertical Nash power structure, issuing platform coupons can always stimulate demand and benefit the manufacturer and the entire system but cannot always benefit the online platform.

show abstract

“…In this section, we extend the models with platform coupons by incorporating customer types. We assume that only a proportion

λ \in ((), 0, 1)

of customers buy the products with platform coupons and their unit payment is

p - f

, while the remaining customers still buy the products at the original price

p

(Li et al, 2020; Li et al, 2021). In this context, the expected customer demand is

q = italicλn ((), 1 - \frac{p - f}{b}) + ((), 1 - λ) n ((), 1 - \frac{p}{b})

.…”

Section: Extension and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of platform coupons and power structure on an e‐commerce supply chain

Wan

2023

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Duan et al [44] empirically studied how online reviews and coupons affected sales, pricing, and profit. The third line involves coupon promotion in the supply chain [6,45,46]. For example, Su et al [6] claimed that coupon trading cannot simultaneously benefit retailers and manufacturers.…”

Section: Coupon Promotionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital Coupon Promotion and Inventory Strategies of Omnichannel Brands

Zhang

2022

Axioms

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates when an omnichannel brand should offer digital coupons in the online and buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) channels and, if so, the joint decision of coupon face value and store inventory. The impact of a digital coupon promotion on store inventory is also explored. Two scenarios are considered, one where consumers’ costs in the online and store channels are homogeneous and another in which they are heterogeneous, and two newsvendor models, with and without a coupon promotion, are constructed under each scenario. The results show that the issuance of coupons improves the omnichannel brand’s profit when the price is high and the coefficient of the difference in valuation between two types of consumers is low in the homogeneous scenario. In the heterogeneous scenario, the brand prefers the coupon promotion when the price is high or moderate and the coefficient of the difference in valuation between two types of consumers is high. In addition, offering a coupon promotion yields a higher store inventory in most cases. However, store inventory is decreased in some special cases in the homogeneous scenario. Moreover, an increased hassle cost in the BOPS channel significantly lowers the offline demand and profit increase from a digital coupon promotion. Furthermore, a coupon promotion is more likely to benefit both the brand and consumers as the cross-selling revenue increases. These results provide guidance for omnichannel brands to implement coupon promotions and adjust store inventory with stochastic demand.

show abstract

“…Many studies have been conducted on the analysis and modeling of various promotional activities. Previous studies focused more on this new business model and, thus, on different forms of promotion, including coupons (Neslin and Shoemaker, 1983;Li et al, 2021;Jiang et al, 2021;Wu et al, 2021), gifts (Khouja et al, 2011;Feng et al, 2021), bundled sales (G€ okg€ ur and Karabatı, 2019), rebate (e.g. Ray et al, 2005;Pei et al, 2021).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal buyback promotion strategy considering consumers' multichannel psychological acquisition

Zhou

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose This paper aims to develop an optimal buyback promotion strategy for enterprises, including multibuyback strategy and self-buyback strategy, taking both the consumer's multichannel psychological acquisition attributes and remaining market into account.Design/methodology/approach Based on the game theory and Hotelling model, the authors formulate a new model to study the equilibrium of different buyback models, given the utility maximization of the consumers, the profit maximization and the constraint on nondecreasing market share of the enterprises, and the authors conduct comparative analysis.Findings Intuitively, enterprises buying back products of other brands would appeal to some consumers. However, the authors find that after implementing the multibuyback scheme, enterprises may not be able to seize competitors' markets or even lose their original customer base in the context considered in this article counterintuitive. In addition, the size of remaining market share and the consumer's multichannel psychological acquisition affect the choice of buyback promotion strategies. Moreover, after implementing multibuyback scheme, customers with old products subsidize those who receive additional discounts. Finally, the authors point out that the buyback strategy choices of companies with different goal-oriented are diverse.Practical implications This study has a very solid realistic background and provides guidance for enterprises to implement buyback promotion strategies. In addition, the authors unearth new influencing factors to provide a reasonable explanation for different buyback strategies in reality.Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is one of the first to explore the multibuyback promotion strategy as a new buyback method, where the two influencing factors the authors have not been proposed so far.

show abstract

Dynamic pricing and coupon promotion strategies in a dual-channel supply chain based on differential game

Cited by 10 publications

References 54 publications

Impacts of platform coupons and power structure on an e‐commerce supply chain

Impacts of platform coupons and power structure on an e‐commerce supply chain

Digital Coupon Promotion and Inventory Strategies of Omnichannel Brands

The optimal buyback promotion strategy considering consumers' multichannel psychological acquisition

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About