2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2114054
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Dynamic Pricing Under Social Learning with Strategic Consumers

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Cited by 8 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Some researchers also study the cases of social learning on other aspects. For example, by establishing a two-period model comprising of one firm and two consumers, Bhalla [18] analyzes the scenario in which consumers learn about product quality. Swinney [19] shows that when consumers discover their preferences by social learning, the effect of quick-response practice is o en weakened since consumers tend to adopt strategic behavior.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some researchers also study the cases of social learning on other aspects. For example, by establishing a two-period model comprising of one firm and two consumers, Bhalla [18] analyzes the scenario in which consumers learn about product quality. Swinney [19] shows that when consumers discover their preferences by social learning, the effect of quick-response practice is o en weakened since consumers tend to adopt strategic behavior.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a companion paper (Bhalla []) we extend the problem to a case where consumers are strategic and have the option to wait before they acquire the product. Like the non‐strategic consumer case, we find that the product is introduced sequentially at a price such that only the High type consumer buys the product.…”
Section: Extensionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, this price is less than that in the non‐strategic consumer case.Lemma (First Period Pricing under Simultaneous Launch). At any point in time t , the seller's pricing strategy in a simultaneous launch is the following: For very low beliefs, there will be no sale. For intermediate beliefs, the seller will sell only to the high type consumer at price, P * ∈ (2 f L ( q t ) − 1; 2 f H ( q t ) − 1). For sufficiently large beliefs, the seller will sell to all types of consumers at price, 2 f L ( q t ) − 1. Proof See Bhalla (). ■…”
Section: Extensionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In dynamic pricing, for example, there is research on interactive selling mechanisms that are sometimes also denoted "dynamic pricing", for example, auctions 5 , competitive bidding, and one-to-one negotiations (e.g. Bichler et al 2002). Regarding strategic customer behaviour, there are a number of authors who call the strategic customers we consider "(completely) rational customers" (e.g.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%