Dynamic reserves in matching markets

Aygün, Orhan; Turhan, Bertan

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2020.105069

Cited by 28 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…There is a large literature on market design under various classes of distributional constraints such as minimum guarantee reserves (or lower quotas), upper quotas, and regional quotas. A partial list includes Abdulkadiroglu (2005), Biro, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove (2010), Kojima (2012), Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013), Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2013), Westkamp (2013), Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014), Echenique and Yenmez (2015), Kamada and Kojima (2015), Kamada and Kojima (2017) Kamada and Kojima (2018), Aygün and Turhan (2016), Aygün and Bo (2016), Bo (2016), Dogan (2016), Kominers and Sonmez (2016), and Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms

Pathak¹,

Sönmez²

2020

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In 2005, the U.S. Congress legislated that the H-1B visa program create 20,000 annual slots reserved for advanced-degree applicants. Since then, the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service (USCIS) has used visa allocation rules that comply with this legislation. Following a directive in the April 2017 Buy American and Hire American Executive Order by President Trump, USCIS tweaked its H-1B visa allocation rule in 2019. While remaining in compliance with the legislation set forth in 2005, the USCIS estimated that the 2019 rule change would increase the number of higher-skill awards by more than 5,000 annually at the expense of lower-skill awards. The rule change was explicitly engineered for this objective. In this paper we characterize all visa allocation rules that comply with the 2005 legislation and use this framework to analyze the rules that have been deployed in the interim. Despite specifying rigid caps, we show that the legislation permits a range of rules that can change the number of high-skill awards by as many as 14,000 in an average year. Of all rules that comply with the legislation, the 2019 rule adopted by the Trump administration maximizes the rate of high-skill awards and minimizes the rate of low-skill awards. However, two previous and relatively unknown changes to the H-1B visa allocation rule resulted in more substantial changes to this distribution. These earlier reforms, however, were motivated by logistical considerations, potentially without understanding of their distributional consequences.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms

Pathak¹,

Sönmez²

2020

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“…In the Indian engineering schools, whether a student is admitted to a reserved seat determines whether college housing is provided, for example. In that case, a solution that considers that preference may restore incentive-compatibility (Aygün and Turhan, 2020).…”

Section: Beyond the Brazilian Casementioning

confidence: 99%

College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case

Aygün

Bó

2021

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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In 2012, Brazilian public universities were mandated to use affirmative action policies for candidates from racial and income minorities. We show that the policy makes the students’ affirmative action status a strategic choice and may reject high-achieving minority students while admitting low-achieving majority students. Empirical data shows evidence consistent with this type of unfairness in more than 49 percent of the programs. We propose a selection criterion and an incentive-compatible mechanism that, for a wider range of similar problems and the one in Brazil in particular, is fair and removes any gain from strategizing over the privileges claimed. (JEL I23, O15, I28, J15, D82, H52)

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“…6 In India, when two or more applicants have the same score, ties are broken with some exogenously given objective criteria. 7 ∅ ≻ means applicant is unacceptable for category at institution .…”

Section: Admission Market Of Technical Universities In Indiamentioning

confidence: 99%