2021
DOI: 10.1007/s12351-021-00665-y
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Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower

Abstract: In this paper, we study a model of a market with asymmetric information and sticky prices—the dynamic Stackelberg model with a myopic follower and infinite time horizon of Fujiwara ("Economics Bulletin" 12(12), 1–9 (2006)). We perform a comprehensive analysis of the equilibria instead of concentrating on the steady state only. We study both the equilibria for open loop and feedback information structure, which turn out to coincide, and we compare the results with the results for Cournot-Nash equilibria.

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…This game consists of two players, each with their points [ 31 , 32 ]. This means that the competition is not about achieving a common goal, and the players compete with each other to improve their situation and increase their profits [ 33 , 34 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This game consists of two players, each with their points [ 31 , 32 ]. This means that the competition is not about achieving a common goal, and the players compete with each other to improve their situation and increase their profits [ 33 , 34 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%