2009
DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003
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Dynamics of strategic three-choice voting

Abstract: In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideologically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties that frequently exchange ma… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Strategic voting introduced in the three-state voter model [30] can reproduce patterns seen in real voting data, where two parties have similar votes and compete for the majority while the third party remains a minority over years. Stochastic effects can, however, interchange one majority party with the minority one, on a time scale growing exponentially with the size of the population, which has also been observed in real elections.…”
Section: Discrete Opinions the Voter Modelmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…Strategic voting introduced in the three-state voter model [30] can reproduce patterns seen in real voting data, where two parties have similar votes and compete for the majority while the third party remains a minority over years. Stochastic effects can, however, interchange one majority party with the minority one, on a time scale growing exponentially with the size of the population, which has also been observed in real elections.…”
Section: Discrete Opinions the Voter Modelmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…The steady-state behavior of the voter model on arbitrary graphs is characterized in [37] through a mean-field approximation. In [38,39] the generalization to three states is considered. The q-voter model is introduced in [40], where each node adopts the state of q randomly selected neighbors, given that they are unanimous.…”
Section: A Socio-physics: the Ising And Voter Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One study choses to select the opinion at a tie either randomly or picking it up from the nearest group [37]. Others works consider the voter model [38,39]. The competition between persuasiveness and inflexibility was also analyzed [40].…”
Section: From Two To Three-party Competitionmentioning
confidence: 99%