Dynasties in Historical Political Economy

Abstract

The hereditary transfer of political power within families is a prominent feature of premodern societies and persists in some form even in modern democracies. This chapter reviews the role of dynasties in the historical development of states and how patterns in dynastic politics serve as a useful metric for understanding the evolution of power and state organization in historical political economy research. The chapter identifies and describes three broad declines in the role of dynasties in politics: (1) a decline of monarchy in favor of democracy and other forms of government, (2) a decline in the prevalence of elected members of dynasties in democracies, and (3) a decline in the gendered differences in dynastic entry into politics. Despite these general declines, dynastic ties remain advantageous to politicians’ careers in many countries, especially when it comes to reaching the top echelons of power in the executive.

Political Dynasties in Canada

“…Beyond these electoral advantages, dynasty members also benefit from career advantages. Dynastic members are more likely to be appointed to cabinet, but only if their previous relatives have been appointed to cabinet as well (Smith and Martin 2017;Van Coppenolle 2017;Van Coppenolle and Smith 2022). We expect the dynasty-cabinet link to be a relevant factor in Canada, as it is in Ireland (Smith and Martin 2017) and the UK (Van Coppenolle 2017).…”

“…Indeed, research on this topic has confirmed that offspring follow their parents into politics in larger numbers than in the general population, with the exception of farming and self-employed proprietors (Dal Bó et al 2009;Laband and Lentz 1985). The implications suggest that dynasties provide potential legislators with a series of advantages ranging from skill transfer, voter loyalty, incumbency advantage and name recognition (Feinstein 2010;Fiva and Smith 2018;Geys 2017;Laband and Lentz 1985;Smith and Martin 2017;Van Coppenolle and Smith 2022). In the US, David Laband and Bernard Lentz (1985) argue that being part of a dynasty might make 'politics' a hereditary skill, providing the legislator with voter loyalty and a higher degree of incumbency advantage than would normally be enjoyed by legislators who are not part of a dynasty.…”

“…While the analysis by Van Coppenolle and Smith (2022) provides us with an insightful understanding of the global trends in political dynasties, the work of Dal Bó et al (2009) offers crucial insights into the possible role of tenure length in dynasty formation. This study confirms that a causal relationship exists in the US Congress between the time spent in office (tenure) and dynasty formation.…”

“…(for a review of the literature, see Geys and Smith 2017;Van Coppenolle and Smith 2022). Indeed, researchers have shown that members of political dynasties receive some sort of electoral benefit from their family ties in legislative assemblies (Feinstein 2010;Fiva and Smith 2018;Laband and Lentz 1985), but the evidence is mixed concerning what causes a dynasty to emerge.…”

“…Considering that Canada has an electoral history going back to the mid-18th century, it is surprising to note that very little has been written on the development, presence and electoral benefits of being part of a political family dynasty in this country. While Daniel Smith (2018) and Brenda van Coppenolle and David Smith (2022) include this case as a comparative unit in their analysis of political dynasties across several countries, the work of Matthew Godwin (2018) represents the only systematic study of family relations in Canada to date. In this article, we add to the comparative literature on political dynasties by analysing the structure of legislative careers over the last 250 years.…”