E<scp>fficient</scp> C<scp>ontract</scp> D<scp>esign for</scp> A<scp>gri</scp>‐E<scp>nvironment</scp> P<scp>olicy</scp>

Moxey, Andrew; White, Ben; Ozanne, Adam

doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x

Cited by 132 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…He then states that any advantage of one policy over another must " be due to inadequate information or uncertainty." This paper, along with the literature on procurement and contracting (Laffont and Tirole, 1993;Laffont and Martimort, 2002) has led to a number of papers applying mechanism design to agri-environmental polices (Wu andBabcock, 1996 andMoxey et al, 1999;Ferraro, 2008;Hanley et al, 2012 andMiteva et al, (2012).…”

Section: Figure 1 Conceptual Model Linking Ecosystem Outputs Inputs mentioning

confidence: 99%

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

White

Hanley

2016

Environ Resource Econ

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Section: Figure 1 Conceptual Model Linking Ecosystem Outputs Inputs mentioning

confidence: 99%

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

White

Hanley

2016

Environ Resource Econ

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“…To avoid the burden of administering more complex schemes with higher associated transaction costs, input-based agri-environmental schemes in the EU and elsewhere make a number of simplifications, some of which have been criticised, for example: tying payments to management inputs or actions rather than actual delivery of desired outputs (Armsworth et al, 2012); using standardised payment rates that may not reflect spatial variations in biophysical conditions, management costs or ecosystem service values (Armsworth et al, 2012); and focusing on individual land management units when some ecosystem services may operate at a greater scale that requires linkages between separate land management units (Moxey et al, 1999;Marggraf, 2003;Groth, 2005;Goldman et al, 2007;Engel et al, 2008;Wunscher et al, 2008;Klimek et al, 2008;ECA, 2011). Although it may appear cheaper to administer input-based schemes, these simplifications may offer a false economy; for example, working in UK uplands, Armsworth et al (2012) estimated that common simplifications in agri-environment schemes (in particular failing to spatially target payments) resulted in a 49-100% reduction in biodiversity benefits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes

Moxey²,

et al. 2014

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. 2014. Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes.Contact CEH NORA team at noraceh@ceh.ac.ukThe NERC and CEH trademarks and logos ('the Trademarks') are registered trademarks of NERC in the UK and other countries, and may not be used without the prior written consent of the Trademark owner.Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes in UK peatlands AbstractThis paper considers how agri-environment schemes under the Common Agricultural Policy could be adapted to derive a higher return of ecosystem services from agricultural land, through deliberation with members of the public, land owners, managers and other stakeholders: i) paying for the ecosystem services that are valued most by society; ii) spatially targeting payments to locations where ecosystem services can most efficiently be provided; and iii) providing incentives for cross-boundary collaboration over the provision of ecosystem services that need to be managed at catchment or wider spatial scales. Using UK upland peatlands as a case study, and drawing on experience tackling these issues in the new Glastir agri-environment scheme in Wales, the paper attempts to find a balance between current input-based schemes that pay for land management activities on the basis of income foregone and output-based schemes that pay by results. The paper reviews evidence that spatially targeted, output-based payments may be more economically efficient than current approaches, but identifies a number of challenges, including: scientific uncertainty; pricing of ecosystem services; timing of payments; increased risk to land managers; compliance with World Trade Organisation regulations; and barriers to cross-boundary collaboration in the management of ecosystem services at habitat, catchment or landscape scales. A number of options are reviewed to overcome these challenges, including: the use of process-based models, pressureresponse functions and expert knowledge to establish causal links between management and ecosystem service delivery and reduce the costs of monitoring; the use of competitive bidding or non-market valuation techniques to set prices for ecosystem service delivery; insurance schemes; combining agri-environment schemes with funding from private Payment for Ecosystem Service schemes; and independent facilitation of groups of potential applicants across property boundaries in scheme options that are co-designed with the land management community. Drawing on examples from UK peatlands and experience designing the Glastir scheme, the paper 2 proposes a number of ways in which agri-environment schemes around the world that make payments on the basis of management inputs can better link payments to the provision of ecosystem services.

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“…Other studies apply the principal-agent theory to analyse the design of AES, focusing on the implications of information asymmetries for contract design (e.g. Moxey et al, 1999;Ozanne et al, 2001). Unlike the studies just described, this paper focuses on the role that the design of AES contracts can have on encouraging farmers to participate in AES.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating farmers' preferences for the design of agri-environment schemes: a choice experiment approach

Ruto

Garrod

2009

Journal of Environmental Planning and Management

276

227

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In recent decades agri-environment schemes (AES) have become an increasingly important tool for policy makers aiming to reverse the post-war decline in environmental quality on agricultural land. The voluntary nature of such schemes means that the decision of farmers to participate is central to achieving policy objectives. This paper therefore uses a choice experiment approach to investigate the role that scheme design can have on encouraging farmers to participate. Choice data was gathered from a survey of farmers in 10 case study areas across the EU and analysed using both mixed logit and latent class models. In general, farmers were found to require greater financial incentives to join schemes with longer contracts or that offer less flexibility or higher levels of paperwork. It was also observed that a large segment of farmers ('low resistance adopters') would be willing to accept relatively small incentive payments for their participation in schemes offering relatively little flexibility and high levels of additional paperwork, when compared to other more 'high resistance adopters'.

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Efficient Contract Design for Agri‐Environment Policy

Cited by 132 publications

References 9 publications

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?

Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes

Investigating farmers' preferences for the design of agri-environment schemes: a choice experiment approach

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