The crisis of 2008 pointed out the weaknesses of the current financial system. Since then, the role of central counterparties (CCP) has become increasingly important. CCPs provide guarantee, i.e., they take over the counterparty risk arising in the course of trading on different markets and guarantee the settlement of transactions. To fulfil this role, the CCP has to maintain financial resources which, in the event of the clearing member's default, are sufficient to cover the arising losses. For this purpose, the CCP operates a guarantee system, one element of this is the clearing members' contributions to the default fund. Our study focuses on the structure of the default fund operated by the CCP, as well as the stress test used for the calculation of the size of it. The results point out that we cannot rely solely on historical data when calculating the default fund. It is evident that excluding the outlier results, which are so-called "extreme but plausible," and building the default fund exclusively on historical data could be misleading, and the system could suffer unexpected and significant losses. Based on the risk mentioned above, hypothetical scenarios must be considered in the course of calculation so that the CCP can be prepared for unexpected losses.