Earmarked taxation: welfare versus political support

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Compared with the traditional public-finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner, earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal-agent setting is considered, where taxing and spending are performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament. We assume that the parliament either maximizes welfare or expected votes. Vote maximizers are more inclined to choose earmarking, but at the price of inefficiently high costs. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Choosing between Service Fees and Budget Funding to Pay for Local Services: Empirical Evidence from Spain

“…In our paper, 1 = λ represents the most progressive available tax policy, whereas 0 = λ is the most regressive one. 3 This type of policy could be regarded as earmarking (Bös, 2000;Anesi, 2006). Unlike the latter cited work, we do not focus on the dynamic effects that earmarking has on service-specific below x).…”

Mechanism for Market Valuation of State-Owned Enterprises without Privatization

“…For example, as a device to limit lobbying by special interest groups, many countries have specific laws against earmarking some types of fiscal revenues (Bös, 2000). This might become a constraint in some countries if the judiciary interprets that replicating the cash flow of an SOE is a kind of earmarked expenditure prohibited by law.…”

Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict

“…Agents in their respective groups can fully influence the distribution they obtain relative to fellow group members. 9 Each member of the winning group experiences a second-stage net pay-off equal to the expected value of the rent minus the individual second-stage rent-seeking costs. Hence, for any agent k of the group of polluters P, the second-stage net pay-off is…”

“…Lai [37] finds the level of aggregate emissions may be higher under RRIs than NRRIs. 2 There exists a prominent strand of literature analyzing the efficiency of preassigned use of fiscal revenues, referring to the latter as 'earmarking' [3,7,[9][10][11]26,40]. Yet, in the public perception, the term 'earmarking' seems to refer rather to a result of appropriation activities by interest groups than a device to prevent them [36].…”