2004
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2004.79.2.277
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Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Planning and Pricing Decisions

Abstract: This paper investigates auditors' assessments of earnings manipulation risk and corporate governance risk, and their planning and pricing decisions in the presence of these identified risks. To conduct this investigation, we use engagement partners' assessments of their existing clients made during the participating public accounting firm's client continuance risk assessment process. We find that auditors plan increased effort and billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk, and that the positive… Show more

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Cited by 570 publications
(418 citation statements)
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“…4 Prior research is generally consistent with auditors responding to risks, although it is somewhat mixed. For example, using a small sample and private data, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) report that auditors plan increased effort and billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk (measured using engagement partner assessments of existing clients).…”
Section: Audit Risk Influences Audit Feesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Prior research is generally consistent with auditors responding to risks, although it is somewhat mixed. For example, using a small sample and private data, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) report that auditors plan increased effort and billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk (measured using engagement partner assessments of existing clients).…”
Section: Audit Risk Influences Audit Feesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Board independence is an important element to ensure the board's ability to effectively monitor management (Bedard and Johnstone, 2004). Independent directors are effective monitors as they are neither financially tied to the firm nor psychologically tied to management (Boo and Sharma, 2008).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, previous literature attempts to identify the practical key determinants of the audit risk, like the client' business risk [48,49], the clients' internal corporate governance features [50,51], the litigation risk [52], book-tax differences [53] and the client financial condition [52]. Within this framework, some scholars identified proxies for each component of the audit risk; as for inherent risk, it seems to be associated to the nature of client's business, size, complexity, leverage and to significant accruals such as receivables and inventory [54][55][56].…”
Section: Audit Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%