Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence

Chaiwongkhot, Poompong; Kuntz, Katanya B.; Zhang, Yanbao; Huang, Anqi; Bourgoin, Jean‐Philippe; Sajeed, Shihan; Lütkenhaus, Norbert; Jennewein, Thomas; Makarov, Vadim

doi:10.1103/physreva.99.062315

Cited by 29 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Most of the imperfections reviewed so far are in fiberbased QKD systems. There are also quantum attacks reported for free-space QKD systems (Chaiwongkhot et al, 2019;Nauerth et al, 2009;Sajeed et al, 2015a). For instance, imperfect encoding methods result in side channels from which encoded states are partially distinguishable (Nauerth et al, 2009).…”

Section: A Back-reflections and Eve's Photon Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Eve can exploit this imperfection and launch the spatial-mode attack against a free-space QKD system. This problem has been carefully studied in (Chaiwongkhot et al, 2019;Sajeed et al, 2015a), following an earlier discussion on the origins of detection efficiency mismatch in (Fung et al, 2009). Besides DV-QKD, the practical security of CV-QKD also deserves future investigations, which will be reviewed in Section VII.C.…”

Section: A Back-reflections and Eve's Photon Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices

Xu¹,

Ma²,

Zhang³

et al. 2020

Rev. Mod. Phys.

1,108

614

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In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics. In practice, however, the imperfections of realistic devices might introduce deviations from the idealized models used in security analyses. Can quantum code-breakers successfully hack real systems by exploiting the side channels? Can quantum code-makers design innovative counter-measures to foil quantum code-breakers? This article reviews theoretical and experimental progress in the practical security aspects of quantum code-making and quantum code-breaking. After numerous attempts, researchers now thoroughly understand and are able to manage the practical imperfections. Recent advances, such as the measurement-device-independent protocol, have closed the critical side channels in the physical implementations, paving the way for secure QKD with realistic devices. VI. DetectionSecurity 36 A. Countermeasures against detection attacks 36 B. Measurement-device-independent scheme 36 1. Time-reversed EPR QKD 36 2. MDI-QKD protocol 37 3. Theoretical developments 38 4. Experimental developments 39 C. Twin-field QKD 41 VII. Continuous-Variable QKD 42 A. Protocol and security 43 1. Gaussian-modulated protocol 43 2. Discrete modulated protocol 44 3. Security analysis 44 B. Experimental developments 45 C. Quantum hacking and countermeasures 46 VIII. Other Quantum Cryptographic Protocols 47 A. Device-independent QKD 47 B. Some New QKD implementations 48 1. Round-robin DPS QKD 48 2. High-dimensional QKD 50 3. QKD with wavelength-division multiplexing 51 4. Chip-based QKD 51 C. Other quantum cryptographic protocols 53 1. Quantum bit commitment 53 2. Quantum digital signature 53 3. Other protocols 54 IX. Concluding Remarks 55 Acknowledgement 57 A. General questions to QKD 57 References 58 1 Google Q: research.google/teams/applied-science/quantum 2 IBM Q: www.research.ibm.com/ibm-q 3 Rigetti: www.rigetti.com 4 CAS-Alibaba: quantumcomputer.ac.cn/index.html 1. Concern 1. Since RSA is secure under current computational power, we do not need QKD now.

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Section: A Back-reflections and Eve's Photon Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Back-reflections and Eve's Photon Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices

Xu¹,

Ma²,

Zhang³

et al. 2020

Rev. Mod. Phys.

1,108

614

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The most effective countermeasure is a spatial mode filter (pinhole); however, this can also be vulnerable in itself due to laser‐induced damage [260]. Atmospheric turbulence will also reduce the efficiency of this attack [261]. The light‐injection attack can be extended to other components such as the quantum random number generators (QRNGs), with the output being biased by injected light [262].…”

Section: Space Quantum Communication Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advances in space quantum communications

Sidhu

Joshi

Gündoğan

et al. 2021

IET Quantum Communication

Self Cite

166

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Concerted efforts are underway to establish an infrastructure for a global quantum Internet to realise a spectrum of quantum technologies. This will enable more precise sensors, secure communications, and faster data processing. Quantum communications are a front-runner with quantum networks already implemented in several metropolitan areas. A number of recent proposals have modelled the use of space segments to overcome range limitations of purely terrestrial networks. Rapid progress in the design of quantum devices have enabled their deployment in space for in-orbit demonstrations. We review developments in this emerging area of space-based quantum technologies and provide a roadmap of key milestones towards a complete, global quantum networked landscape. Small satellites hold increasing promise to provide a cost effective coverage required to realise the quantum Internet. The state of art in small satellite missions is reviewed and the most current in-field demonstrations of quantum cryptography are collated. The important challenges in space quantum technologies that must be overcome and recent efforts to mitigate their effects are summarised. A perspective on future developments that would improve the performance of space quantum communications is included. The authors conclude with a discussion on fundamental physics experiments that could take advantage of a global, space-based quantum network.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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“…However, in practice, devices often behave differently than the assumed model, leaving a gap between theory and practice that can be exploited by an eavesdropper. This gap can be anywhere in the system implementation such as measurement devices [9,10], monitoring systems [11], assumption in the security proofs [12], leakage of information [13][14][15], change of characteristics [16,17], imperfect sources [18,19], imperfect detector characteristics [20][21][22][23] etc. It is essential for QKD security to explore and identify these gaps and characterize them in order to as-sess the threat.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is essential for QKD security to explore and identify these gaps and characterize them in order to as-sess the threat. In this work we analyze one such gapdetector-efficiency mismatch [20,21,23,24]-and analyze its effects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A generalized efficiency mismatch attack to bypass detection-scrambling countermeasure

Fatin¹,

Sajeed²

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

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The ability of an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum communication system by changing the angle of the incoming light is well-known. Randomizing the role of the detectors has been proposed to be an efficient countermeasure to this type of attack. Here we show that the proposed countermeasure can be bypassed if the attack is generalized by including more attack variables. Using the experimental data from existing literature, we show how randomization effectively prevents the initial attack but fails to do so when Eve generalizes her attack strategy. Our result and methodology could be used to security-certify a free-space quantum communication receiver against all types of detector-efficiency-mismatch type attacks.

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Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence

Cited by 29 publications

References 46 publications

Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices

Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices

Advances in space quantum communications

A generalized efficiency mismatch attack to bypass detection-scrambling countermeasure

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