2020
DOI: 10.3765/sp.13.19
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Eavesdropping: What is it good for?

Abstract: Judgments about truth, retraction, and consistency across contexts have been used in recent years to argue both for and against the revisionary theses of relativism about truth and expressivism about apparently truth-apt expressions like epistemic modals. We show that we find the same patterns that have been observed for epistemic modal claims like Might p when it comes to first-person attitude claims with the form I think that p . This poses a serious challenge to many extant accounts of eavesdropping judgmen… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2023
2023
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
4

Relationship

1
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 31 publications
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Indeed, in addition to helping explain other reasoning fallacies, the notion of conversational relevance may play a role in a variety of other contexts in psychology, linguistics, and philosophy: compare existing work on explaining judgments about conditionals(Lassiter, 2023;Lassiter & Li, 2024;Over, 2023;Over & Evans, 2024) as well as a variety of patterns involving truth-value judgments, where manipulation of the question under discussion has been shown to influence truth-value judgments(Beddor & Egan, 2018;Kroll & Rysling, 2019;Phillips & Mandelkern, 2020).12 A different, intriguing possibility, suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer for this journal, would be to incorporate relevance into an averaging model of the conjunction fallacy.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, in addition to helping explain other reasoning fallacies, the notion of conversational relevance may play a role in a variety of other contexts in psychology, linguistics, and philosophy: compare existing work on explaining judgments about conditionals(Lassiter, 2023;Lassiter & Li, 2024;Over, 2023;Over & Evans, 2024) as well as a variety of patterns involving truth-value judgments, where manipulation of the question under discussion has been shown to influence truth-value judgments(Beddor & Egan, 2018;Kroll & Rysling, 2019;Phillips & Mandelkern, 2020).12 A different, intriguing possibility, suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer for this journal, would be to incorporate relevance into an averaging model of the conjunction fallacy.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If that's a sensible thing for B to say -and it would seem to be at first blush -then it puts some pressure on the claim that A's and B's judgments are both true. This is analogous to the so-called 'eavesdropper' cases that have bedevilled the literature on epistemic modals (see, for instance, Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson, 2005, Hawthorne, 2007, von Fintel and Gillies, 2008, MacFarlane, 2011, Phillips and Mandelkern, 2020. To take a familiar example, suppose Holmes and Watson are at Baker St using a wire to listen in on a conversation between Moriarty and his underlings.…”
Section: Is Risk 'Objective'?mentioning
confidence: 95%