Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Perceptually-Guided Action vs. Sensation-Based Enaction1

Abstract

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both challenge representationist cognitive science, but the two approaches have only begun to engage in dialogue. Further conceptual clarification is required in which differences are as important as common ground. This paper enters the dialogue by focusing on important differences. After a brief account of the parallel histories of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism, we cover incompatibility between them regarding their theories of sensation and perception. First, we show how and why in ecological theory perception is, crutially, not based on sensation. We elucidate this idea by examining the biological roots of work in the two fields, concentrating on Gibson and Varela and Maturana. We expound an ecological critique of any sensation based approach to perception by detailing two topics: classic retinal image theories and perception in single-celled organisms. The second main point emphasizes the importance of the idea of organism-environment mutuality and its difference from structural coupling of sensations and motor behavior. We point out how ecological-phenomenological methods of inquiry grow out of mutualism and compare Gibson's idea of visual kinesthesis to Merleau-Ponty's idea of the lived body. Third, we conclude that Ecological Psychology and varieties of Enactivism are laying down different paths to pursue related goals. Thus, convergence of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism is not possible given their conflicting assumptions, but cross-fertilization is possible and desirable.

Pretend play with objects: an ecological approach

“…Some authors currently suggest that radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological and the enactive (Baggs & Chemero, 2018). These approaches stare at each other over an "uncanny valley": in many ways their main proposals are strikingly similar, however, their understanding of action, perception and cognition turn out to be different upon closer inspection (Di Paolo, 2016;Heft, 2020;Read & Szokolszky, 2020). Major points of divergence relate to the interpretation of the role of sensation and perception as the basis of action and the interpretation of organism-environment relations (elaborated in Read & Szokolszky, 2020).…”

“…These approaches stare at each other over an "uncanny valley": in many ways their main proposals are strikingly similar, however, their understanding of action, perception and cognition turn out to be different upon closer inspection (Di Paolo, 2016;Heft, 2020;Read & Szokolszky, 2020). Major points of divergence relate to the interpretation of the role of sensation and perception as the basis of action and the interpretation of organism-environment relations (elaborated in Read & Szokolszky, 2020). Enactivism has roots in phenomenology and takes sensorimotor capacities and contingencies as the basis for action.…”

“…On the enactivist account perception is based on physical changes in sensors (subpersonal level) that are then acted upon as internal states. For example, in the case of a frog seeing and targeting a fly as prey there is an internal correlation between "the place where the retina receives a given perturbation and the muscular contractions that move the tongue, the mouth, the neck, and, in fact, the frog's entire body" (Maturana andVarela, 1988, 126, cited andanalyzed in Read &Szokolszky, 2020). This correlation is termed "sensorimotor coordination."…”

“…The concept of affordances was introduced to account for directly meaningful, value oriented, organismic level actions -a job sensorimotor capacities are incapable of. As emphasized, again, by Read and Szokolszky (2020), if perception is defined as a sensorimotor process, then it is carried out by cells or tissues or organs. But if perception is defined as direct resonance to relational structure in the ambient array, as suggested by the ecological approach, then it is carried out by organisms with the appropriate perceptual and action systems that explore and resonate to useful, directly meaningful relational structures in the world.…”

Active Inference and Cooperative Communication: An Ecological Alternative to the Alignment View

“… Bruineberg, Rietveld and Kiverstein qualify this interpretation of "ecologicalenactive." However, given the ongoing discussion concerning the compatibility of enactivism and ecological psychology (see e.g.,Heft, 2020;Read and Szokolszky, 2020) and the fact that our own presentation of these ideas does not depend on enactivist elements, we prefer to use simply the "ecological" label.Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org…”