Econometric Estimates of Army Retention: Zones A, B, C, D and Retirement-Eligible, 1990-2004

Moore, Carole; Hogan, Paul; Kirchner, Christian; Macklin, Patrick C.; Greenston, Peter M.

doi:10.21236/ada464636

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“…Estimates from a pooled model based on data for all Army MOSs indicate that a one-multiple SRB increase raises Zone A reenlistment by 6.4 percentage points and Zone B reenlistment by 4.4 percentage points. The second study, by Moore et al (2006), used Army data over the period FY 2001FY -2004. The pooled model estimates from this study indicate that a one-multiple SRB increase raises Zone A reenlistment by 3.6 percentage points and Zone B reenlistment by 3.9 percentage points.…”

Section: Results Of Annual Data Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Asch¹,

Heaton²,

Hosek³

et al. 2010

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Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of DefenseApproved for public release; distribution unlimitedThe RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2010 RAND CorporationPermission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.iii This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments. The report should be of interest to policymakers concerned with military recruiting and retention and to defense manpower researchers.

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Section: Results Of Annual Data Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%