Economic Analysis of International Law: An Invitation and a Caveat

Dunoff, Jeffrey L.; Trachtman, Joel P.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.73688

Cited by 16 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Barton (1972);Calabresi and Melamed (1972);Macneil (1978);Shavell (1980); Rogerson (1984); Scott (1987); Ayres and Gertner (1989);Schwartz (1992); Hermalin and Katz (1993); Kaplow and Shavell (1995);Cohen (1999);Craswell (1999);and Mahoney (1999). Only a few authors so far have approached international contracts (treaties) from this perspective (Bhandari and Sykes, 1998;Dunoff and Trachtman, 1999;Posner, 1988).…”

Section: (C)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Contracts are best defined as a mutual exchange of enforceable commitments over time (Craswell, 1999;Dunoff and Trachtman, 1999). Every contract needs to be enforceable -no matter whether it is a simple purchase of a candy bar, a more complicated employment contract or a complex long-term, repeated-interaction treaty such as a multilateral trade agreement.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If a dispute institution is known to be "captured" by one powerful Member, its reputation as a reliable and credible source of information and judgement diminishes in the eyes of the other Member (Milgrom et al, 1990;Abbott and Snidal, 1998). 50 See for example Dunoff and Trachtman (1999), Downs and Rocke (1995), Rosendorff and Milner (2001), Ethier (2001), Rosendorff (2005), Roitinger and Hauser (2003), Horn et al (2005;. 51 According to the authors, trade agreements can be called "rationally incomplete contracts".…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Keck

Schropp

2007

SSRN Journal

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Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism. However, economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of an impartial third party, a "trade court". Typically, economists focusing on the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why institutions are needed, since under standard assumptions, neither defection from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur. This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories, we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles, including that of an information repository and disseminator, an honest broker, an arbitrator and calculator of damages, an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.

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Section: (C)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Keck

Schropp

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…Dunoff and Trachtman (1999). By far the bulk of the law and economics research in international law pertains to the law of international trade.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economics of Public International Law

Posner¹

2010

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“…O ponto principal para explicar o cumprimento das normas é o custo de violação (DUNOFF; TRATCHMAN, 1999). O custo de violação deve considerar os danos (valor a ser compensado pela quebra do compromisso) e a probabilidade das instituições envolvidas imporem o pagamento desses danos.…”

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Estados e investidores estrangeiros: é possível alcançar cooperação?

Silva

2017

Rev. direito GV

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ResumoUma parcela significativa de países, com dificuldades para financiar sua própria economia, tem buscado atrair capital estrangeiro para desenvolver atividades produtivas em seus territórios. Contudo, essas relações entre Estados e investidores estrangeiros são marcadas, historicamente, por conflitos. Estados e investidores, como agentes racionais, estão sempre buscando maximizar suas retribuições. Nesse contexto, conflitam as expectativas de ganhos futuros resultantes dos investimentos com os ganhos imediatos decorrentes de uma expropriação. Entretanto, como essa relação se perpetua no tempo, pode haver alguma cooperação entre as partes. O Direito é um dos elementos, nessa estrutura de incentivos, que pode possibilitar maior cooperação entre Estados e investidores estrangeiros. O presente artigo reúne considerações da literatura estrangeira em Análise Econômica do Direito, que utilizam a perspectiva da escolha racional e a teoria dos jogos, para analisar o papel dos Acordos de Proteção e Promoção de Investimentos e da arbitragem investidor-Estado instituída por esses acordos, nas relações entre Estados e investidores estrangeiros. Palavras-chave

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Economic Analysis of International Law: An Invitation and a Caveat

Cited by 16 publications

References 24 publications

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Economics of Public International Law

Estados e investidores estrangeiros: é possível alcançar cooperação?

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