Economic Development and Sectoral Unions in China

Abstract

Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in China's Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces, the author asks how post-socialist unions respond to worker unrest and why the development of sectoral-level bargaining has been uneven in different regions of China. While Zhejiang has had relative success in establishing the organizational infrastructure for sectoral bargaining, Guangdong has had little success despite ongoing attempts by unions. The author explains variation in sectoral-level bargaining through an analysis of the different models of economic development, which are characterized as local entrepreneurialism and global integration for Zhejiang and Guangdong, respectively. Despite having different organizational forms, unions in both places suffer from a lack of credibility and capacity to enforce contracts. Given the ACFTU's ongoing focus on sectoral-level bargaining, however, experiments will likely continue in various regions and industries throughout China.

Experimentation and decentralization in China’s labor relations

“…Although decentralization has been the unmistakable trend over the past 30 years, recently there have been some countervailing tendencies towards modest centralization. This has been particularly apparent in the sanitation industry in Guangzhou, which after being radically marketized and decentralized after WTO entry in 2001 experienced ongoing strike waves (Friedman, 2014a). Another highly publicized effort in Wuhan led to city-wide bargaining in the food and beverage industry, and the final agreement claimed to cover 450,000 employees.…”

Labor Unrest and Incipient Collective Bargaining in China

“…Similar to that of decentralized and formalistic bargaining, the reasons for ineffectiveness at this level include the union's focus on formalistic terms, the absence of strict enforcement, and often, worker ignorance of the terms of the agreement, or that they were represented by a union (a frequent issue when union representatives are not directly elected) (Wu, 2012). A classic example here is Friedman's (2014b) study of sectoral bargaining in Rui'an eyeglass cluster in Zhejiang Province, where workers interviewed indeed knew nothing about the industry level contract that covered them. Probably the best-known case of failure of enforcement of collective bargaining can be found in Wuhan, where the local government, in a top-down process initiated sectoral negotiations in 2011 in the restaurant industry.…”

“…Despite these issues, the ACFTU continues to focus on building collective bargaining institutions at the industry and regional levels. In Guangzhou, for instance, the official union has organized the construction industry, although no collective bargaining has been successfully achieved (Friedman, 2014b). In addition, union organizing by region has also been identified in areas with clusters of small businesses, such as community unions, village union associations, market unions, office building unions, and union associations by ownership in development zones (Liu, 2010).…”

“…Our current ongoing research suggests that these employer associations are half-hearted partners in promoting collective bargaining. Local employer associations, although theoretically have to be affiliated with the two big national associations, often enjoy more autonomy from the state as well as their upper levels in decision making than their equivalents on the union side do (Friedman, 2014b). This allows them to ignore collective bargaining, or when it suits their interests to encourage and promote it.…”

Job satisfaction and employee’s unionization decision: The mediating effect of perceived union instrumentality

“…Hitherto, Chinese labor union scholars were mainly interested in whether labor unions could protect employees' rights and whether they were independent from the Chinese central government (Zhang, 2009;Lu, Tao & Wang, 2009;Friedman, 2014). In a recent review by Zhang (2009), he concluded that: (1) Chinese unions were not completely independent from the government, but their role was changing, and the government gave unions supports in the protection of workers' rights; (2) There were different types of unions, serving different purposes, and some of them had conflicting interests (e.g., government organized unions versus enterprise organized unions).…”