Economic Dynamics

Gandolfo, Giancarlo

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03871-6

Cited by 178 publications

(117 citation statements)

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“…are in absolute value less than unity. This condition can be given in terms of the coefficients of the characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix (Cohn-Schur´s conditions, see Gandolfo [9]). …”

Section: Local Stability Of the Bertrand-nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

On the dynamics of economic games based on product differentiation

Andaluz

Jarne

2015

Mathematics and Computers in Simulation

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Section: Local Stability Of the Bertrand-nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

On the dynamics of economic games based on product differentiation

Andaluz

Jarne

2015

Mathematics and Computers in Simulation

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“…In this section we consider the case of identical effort effectiveness a 1 = a 2 = a (14) so that the firms can only differ with respect to their inertia, the following fixed points are obtained:…”

Section: The Case a 1 = Amentioning

confidence: 99%

A dynamic marketing model with best reply and inertia

Bischi

Baiardi

2015

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online xxx a b s t r a c tIn this paper we consider a nonlinear discrete-time dynamic model proposed by Farris et al. (2005) as a market share attraction model with two firms that decide marketing efforts over time according to best reply strategies with naïve expectations. The model also considers an adaptive adjustment toward best reply, a form of inertia or anchoring attitude, and we investigate the effects of heterogeneities among firms. A rich scenario of local and global bifurcations is obtained even with just two competing firms, and a comparison is proposed with apparently similar duopoly models based on repeated best reply dynamics with naïve expectations and adaptive adjustment.

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“…For the stability of the equilibrium E * when 0 < r < 1, it is required that the following system of inequalities (known as Schur or Jury's conditions, see e.g. [26][27][28]) is satisfied:…”

Section: A Useful Benchmark Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games

Baiardi

Lamantia

Radi

2015

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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In this paper, we propose an evolutionary model of oligopoly competition where agents can select between different behavioral rules to make decisions on productions. We formalize the model as a general class of evolutionary oligopoly games and then we consider an example with two specific rules, namely Local Monopolistic Approximation and Gradient dynamics. We provide several results on the global dynamic properties of the model, showing that in some cases the attractor of the system may belong to an invariant plane where only one behavioral rule is adopted (monomorphic state). The attractors on the invariant planes can be either strong attractors or weak attractors. However, we also explain why the system can be in a state of Evolutionary Stable Heterogeneity, where it is more profitable for the agents to employ both heuristics in the long term (polymorphic state)

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Economic Dynamics

Cited by 178 publications

References 0 publications

On the dynamics of economic games based on product differentiation

On the dynamics of economic games based on product differentiation

A dynamic marketing model with best reply and inertia

Evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games

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