Economic models of sponsored content in wireless networks with uncertain demand

Andrews, Matthew; Özen, Ulaş; Reiman, Martin I.; Wang, Qiong

doi:10.1109/infcomw.2013.6562872

Cited by 40 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Given a strategy profile x, by (5) and 6, we can obtain the corresponding transaction selling priceπ s and transaction buying priceπ b . We first study the user i's optimal decision of quantity, given his role and price, and other users' strategies.…”

Section: Appendix B Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Economics of Mobile Data Trading Market

Cheung

Huang

2020

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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To exploit users' heterogeneous data demands, several mobile network operators worldwide have launched the mobile data trading markets, where users can trade mobile data quota with each other. In this paper, we aim to understand the importance of data trading market (DTM) by studying the users' operator selection and trading decisions, and analyzing the operator's profit maximizing strategy. We model the interactions between the mobile operator and the users as a three-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the operator chooses the operation fee imposed on sellers to maximize its profit. In Stage II, each user chooses his operator. In Stage III, each DTM user chooses his trading decisions. We derive the closed-form expression of the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) in Stages II and III, where every user proposes the same price such that the total demand matches with the total supply. We further show that the Stage I's problem is convex and compute the optimal operation fee. Our analysis and numerical results show that an operator with a small initial market share can increase its profit by proposing a DTM, which is in line with the real-world situation in Hong Kong.

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Section: Appendix B Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the end of every data trading horizon, all users can access the aggregate information on other users' decisions of the last data trading horizon, by checking the updated 5. For the details of the mechanism, please refer to Appendix A. market information on the platform.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Economics of Mobile Data Trading Market

Cheung

Huang

2020

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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“…presented a quantitative framework to evaluate the benefits among the ISPs, CPs, and end-users' [18]. Some existing works also studied the interactions between the CP and the ISP [19]- [23].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentivizing Mobile Video Users With Data Sponsoring and Edge Caching

et al. 2020

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Recently, edge caching has emerged as a new data sponsoring scheme, where the devices on the edge network, e.g., 4G/5G base stations, cache video contents and directly delivery them to mobile video users. Such caching schemes have significantly decreased the backhaul congestion, reduce the delivery latency, thus attract more mobile video users and monetize a huge number of videos. In this paper, we consider a hybrid caching schemes system, which combines edge cache sponsoring (ECS) and traditional cellular data sponsoring (CDS), where the content providers display advertisements to mitigate the cellular data downloading expense and provide attractive contents for mobile video users. In the system, we investigate the cooperative scenario and the competitive scenario between the two sponsoring schemes, and a mobile video user can select one scheme or neither of them for the requests of a video. In the first scenario, we focus on achieving the maximal total benefit of content providers by optimizing CDS and ECS schemes together. In the second scenario, we separately optimize ECS and CDS schemes and maximize the benefits of corresponding content providers. To illustrate the effectiveness of the two scenarios, we formulate the system as a two-stage game: 1) in the first stage, content providers (i.e., leaders) choose the sponsor effort in sponsor schemes (cooperatively or competitively); 2) in the second stage, mobile video users (i.e., followers) select their sponsor preferences. We conduct numerical results to explore the sub-game perfect equilibrium and find that the joint utilization of the two sponsor schemes can benefit the mobile video users, i.e., when ECS and CDS compete with each other, MUs can benefit 36% ∼ 140% more than the case where there exists only one sponsor scheme. While when CPs cooperate with each other, their total payoff is maximized, the mobile video users' payoff also increases. Moreover, we find that ECS can benefit the content providers more than CDS when sponsor revenue is high, and this indicates that ECS is a promising sponsor scheme for the high-value contents. INDEX TERMS Data sponsoring, edge caching, content delivery networks.

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“…Thus, the demand which is served by the SP is referred to as the realized demand Q, which is the total effective bandwidth supply in Eq. (6).…”

Section: A Stage 4 : Cps' Bandwidth Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Netflix signed a deal with AT&T in July 2014 to deliver its streaming content via wireless broadband network with higher capacity. The design of AT&T sponsored data program in [6] is developed via a Stackelberg game between an SP leader and a CP follower. A utility maximization based rate allocation model with pricing CPs in [7] indicates that the CPs can gain net surplus in the monopolistic and competitive market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tiered Licensed-Assisted Access with Paid Prioritization: A Game Theoretic Approach for Unlicensed LTE

Shih

Wei

2015

Proceedings of the 11th EAI International Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustn

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The network congestion is caused by the rapidly growing data traffic and the limited wireless radio resources. In addition to the licensed spectrum, the access to unlicensed spectrum (e.g., LAA) brings hope for the service provider (SP) to mitigate the deficiency of radio resources. The premium peering deal with the content providers (CPs) can be an approach to efficiently allocate the scarce radio resources to the CPs with higher traffic load and QoS requirement. This work contributes to a content premium pricing framework for one SP and several CPs, where the SP possesses both LTE and LAA. Through the four-stage Stackelberg game, job market signaling game and second price auction, we derive the optimal bandwidth demand of each CP, the optimal amounts of licensed bandwidth and unlicensed bandwidth required by the SP, the premium access fee and basic access fee. Analysis shows that the CPs and the SP all benefit from the premium access deal. Furthermore, there is a tradeoff between improvement and variability of the SP's profit when introducing LAA.

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Economic models of sponsored content in wireless networks with uncertain demand

Cited by 40 publications

References 4 publications

Economics of Mobile Data Trading Market

Economics of Mobile Data Trading Market

Incentivizing Mobile Video Users With Data Sponsoring and Edge Caching

Tiered Licensed-Assisted Access with Paid Prioritization: A Game Theoretic Approach for Unlicensed LTE

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