Economic Theory of Bargaining in Agriculture

Discussion: Collective Bargaining for Agriculture, Marketing Boards, Marketing Orders, and Other Controls

“…For example, according to Johnson, Hoos and HeImberger assume that the bargaining cooperative has no control over the disposition of whatever quantity its members elect to produce. In point of fact, Hoos and I have always given great emphasis to the membership agreement which appoints the cooperative as the member's exclusive sales agent and therefore passes control over the disposition of the member's output to the cooperative [1]. To take another example, Wood makes a plea for more precise and rigorous definitions in nontechnical language, whereas the major reason, if not the only one, for technical language is precision and rigor.…”

“…He does this by (1) assuming that collective bargaining can be linked up with almost any number of collateral institutions, such as market orders, production controls, or marketing boards; (2) listing conditions which marketing cooperatives must seek to secure if their ventures are to be successful; and (3) citing the impacts of marketing orders in fluid milk markets, especially the phenomenon of super-pool pricing. Each of these reasons will be discussed in turn.…”